

PANEL B - IS THE EU A MELTING POT? ANY SIGNS OF AN EU IDENTITY FORMING?

Chair: Hans Rauscher, Der Standard

Panellists: Karin Liebhart, Universität Wien (AT); Laurent Goetschel, Universität Basel (CH); Nermin Abadan-Unat, Bogaziçi University (TR); Elisabeth Bakke, University of Oslo (NO)

Hans Rauscher:

Good afternoon. My name is Hans Rauscher. I am an Austrian journalist, columnist for the daily newspaper "Der Standard". It is a liberal newspaper for those who don't know it. It is my pleasure and the honour to be the moderator in this panel. We will try to keep you awake after lunch. Our topic consists of a lot of questions: Is there a European identity? Is there a European melting pot?; and this goes hand in hand with a lot of other questions "Is there a European? Is there not? Is something forming that forms a distinction European identity? What are the demarcation lines between what is EU and what is not European, what are the components of such identity? How do such identities form? And so on and so on...If we manage to answer one or two of those question we will be very lucky, but the question of a European identity gets more interesting and gets more relevant with each step of enlargement and each step of transmigration in the European countries. To answer these questions – I think there is a European identity, but there is not a long ethnic line or it is not a European demos. It's something in the mind, it's something in history, it's something even spiritual and it's also something that has to grow and it's something that is being engineered from above. Identity as a nation state or as an identity of a nation state is an idea that is not very old. It is 200 years old. The national identity of Germany or of France was formed mainly in the early and during the 19th century. The Austrian-Hungarian monarchy for instance tried to avoid a national identity, because it was a multinational identity, but of course this didn't work. Switzerland today sees itself as a multicultural state. Identity in the EU, the founding fathers of the EU were deeply religious – Schumann, Adenauer, De Gasperi. Today religion is evaporating in Europe. The Pope said "Der Glaube verdunstet," "Believe is evaporating". So to see European identity as purely religious is not possible anymore and it shouldn't be tried too, because in my view, the foundations of the European identity is the Greek philosophy with emphasis on personal freedom and individualism, is the Roman rule of law, is the Christian faith and the enlightenment as rationalism, it's a mix. So "the EU is not a Christian Club", as I think Premier Edwian was once saying, but a mixture of Christian and liacistic strains of thought. In my core opinion, and I stop giving my opinion in a minute, this is the core of the

European identity – a mixture, in contrast to some other societies, some Islamic society where Religion is far stronger and laicism is much weaker. So in my opinion, something like a European identity exists, not in an ethnic sense, but in a political sense, democracy, human rights, civil rights, equality per se, but also very important equality of women – this is accepted in the whole of Europe to a higher or to a lower degree. Some might even mention market economy or the welfare state as part of the European identity. This is a common basis. This is enough for me. And now I am going to introduce you to the members of this panel. I start on my left, there's Professor Nermin Abadan-Unat, She is a very well-known Turkish political scientist. She has written extensively about the problems of Turkish migrants of Europe, in Western Europe. She is, I think, a very strong feminist, a fighter for women's rights. She has had a lot of influence, I think, on a lot of people. I seem to remember that one member of the Turkish diplomacy core, the ambassador of Turkey, today told me that he was a disciple of her. At present she is Professor of political science at Bosphorus University in Istanbul and she also teaches in women's location centre at the University of Istanbul and you are also at Bogaziçi University. Is the pronunciation right? She was born in Vienna, for some reason, perhaps we will hear more about it.

On my right is Professor Elisabeth Bakke. She comes from Norway, she was originally a journalist, PR-manager and editor. She is a specialist in the problems in the Czechoslovakia, in the years between the First and the Second World War, is that right, a problem that we Austrians are rather familiar with. And recently she is associate Professor in the department of political science at the University of Oslo and head of European studies since 2005 and her research interests are nationalism, national and European identity and central Europe, which has been a hot bed and could be again of nationalism and thoughts about identity.

On my far right, from you on the far left, is Professor Goetschel, Professor of political science at the University of Basel, at the Europe institute and director of the Swiss Peace Foundation here in Bern. He has also been a journalist with the associated press and he also served in government as an aid to the Swiss foreign minister Micheline (Kalmire) from 2002 to 2004.

Last, but not least is something, somebody I have to look up in my papers.

Karin Liebhart:

I am not Erika Thurner, I am her substitute.

Hans Rauscher:

Okay, so you could probably introduce yourself until I find, äm...

Karin Liebhart:

Yes, good afternoon to all of you, my name is Karin Liebhart. I am a political scientist and I work as at the political science institute at Vienna University. It's really a great pleasure to be here and to join this discussion. I am not sure, should I start or would you like to invite another speaker.

Hans Rauscher:

No, just two more sentences and then I would ask you for your statement. We should try, I see a lot of younger people in this room, we should try to get to the problems how younger people get or not get their European identity, how they live and find their identity in their respective societies, we should try to get as near to reality as we can. Now I would like to ask you for your remarks.

Karin Liebhart:

Thank you very much. I would like to reformulate the question in this regard that is it a point of necessity that we have to have a European identity? For what should we have a European identity? One of the commissioners stated that the average citizen cannot fall in love with the common mark so therefore there has to be something that can be called identity based on the culture or whatever. But I think the basic question is how much in common does a community need to form an identity? Has identity to be based on values, on some kind of political or cultural heritage or is it enough that a community agrees on procedures for example? Procedures how to safe-guard fair negotiation and how to have a fair decision making process for instance and how to build up within about...how different value negotiations can take place. This for sure refers to the point that basic democracy says human rights and tolerance and transparency have to be safe-guarded. But I think the construction of European identity is more a question of the process, a question of dynamics and not a static concept that is based on values or heritage. Today, for sure, Europe is not a question of defined borders, if it ever was, but after the fall of the iron curtain the political landscape has completely changed and nowadays we live in a world of peace as the anthropologist Clifford Geertz once said and I would agree to this portrayal.

From my point of view, Europe is a dynamic mental landscape. It is a question of mind. It might be the most interesting approach to look especially at the border regions, to look at the trans-regional processes of forming identities, not stick at the nation state, but transgress this nation of nation state and built unity, indiversity of nations by combining diversity of nation states. Maybe the idea of identity as some sort of a precollage is the most interesting, because it's the most dynamic approach. It goes without saying that concepts of identity are linked to memory construction and the idea of a common European memory instead of two memories before 1989. But I refrain from elaborating on this and going into detail in view of the time. Maybe we can come back to this point during the discussion. I would limit my statement to my major point and leave the other points out. What I am really convinced of is that the European identity will not emerge as the outcome of some kind of a master plan or as some kind of strategic implementation from above. I think what we can observe now is the development of a common identity by means of everyday life experiences and by means of a popular culture. I would like to introduce three examples that shed light on this idea. First of all, despite the financial crisis, it's clear that we are part of this crisis, but the people use the Euro currency. They use it day by day, not all European Union members use it, so it's not limited to the EU, but it is an experience people make day by day. Secondly, Erasmus or Sokrates exchange programs, just to recall twenty or twenty-five years ago it was not normal to study one year abroad to go to any other European, or outside European state to study. Nowadays it's taken for granted and it's not the exception. So, I think people that have this experience that travel and live in other cultural and political contexts, they develop a sense of belonging, not only to their national culture, or their nation state or their political system or their national sense of Austrian or, however. Third, this emerging class or new group of travellers, if you think about the low budget airlines like SkyEurope or Easyjet or all the other, this phenomenon forms kind of a new network in Europe. This new network does not only include the capitals, especially the so-called second cities are connected and people use these mean of travelling and are travelling and this might lead to other perspectives of what is Europe, because Europe becomes more and more a matter of proximity. Distance is not longer that issue. My final statement, or to conclude, is that I this might improve the process of a European identity, but I would like to underscore that European identity does not mean EU identity, because these phenomenon that I tried to describe briefly, they are not limited to the EU border or no other borders of the neighbourhood region. Thank you very much.

Hans Rauscher:

Thank you. Just two points. You mentioned the use of the Euro and the crisis and of course right now we are in a situation where the EU has to prove and is even in her most important test that they can do something about the crisis. If the EU fails in this to get a grip on the crisis, which is obviously a major world crisis, then we can kiss every thought of developing an European identity good-bye. But, in this context those countries that have the Euro didn't experience speculation runs on their currencies and those who don't have the Euro, Poland for instance and Iceland they of course want to get in. This is just a remark on the practical aspects. I happen to think that if the EU doesn't work in this context relating to the crisis then all these wonderful discussions and seminars will be in vain. Second, in the morning a journalistic colleague from Norway said that she feels European when she's living in the USA and I want to confirm that. The USA is also a Western country, but I feel very very European when I am there. For our next panellist Professor Nermin Abadan-Unat, as I said before, she has done a very extensive work on the problems and on the development of Turkish immigrants in Western Europe. Please let us share your thought.

Nermin Abadan-Unat:

Meine Herren und Damen, Seine Exzellenzen die Botschafter der verschiedenen Länder. Ich bin in Wien geboren. Meine Muttersprache war Deutsch. Ich habe Türkisch später gelernt. Was bin ich? Bin ich Europäerin? Bin ich Weltbürgerin? Sie werden es feststellen wie man verschiedene Identitäten bekommen kann. Nun werde ich weitersprechen in Englisch.

His Excellencies, the ambassadors of participating states, ladies and gentlemen it's my pleasure to be able to speak here and to have such a wonderful moderator who is summarizing so many things so quickly. Indeed I have spent about forty years on this process and my book is called "Migration without End" and I don't anticipate anything ending, because the UN has already predicted that if we don't settle then there will be 700 million on the move in the future so the prospects are not very bright, but let's now go back to what's going on in Europe. I just want to recall you that there has been an American sociologist, Daniel (Lerner), who has published a classical book called "The Passing of Traditional Society" in which he was enquiring about how modern are the six different countries in the Middle East. He had developed a typology of traditional, transitional and modern minded people and he was asking the following question "Can you imagine yourself to live somewhere in a place where you have not been born?" and the result in

1950 was that 49 percent of the traditionalists said that they cannot imagine. They would also say that "We would rather kill ourselves instead of leaving this place" and even a doctor was among those people. The transitionals accepted the statement 74 percent, the modern 94 percent. When we consider that from 1950 to 1960 there are only ten years and during those ten years the Turks started to do individually what they had never done before, because before that they were only pushing the army, but this time they used their feet. When I conducted my first research in 1963 at that point in Germany there were 2700 workers, which was 0.4 percent. In 1970, ten years later, they had jumped to 464 000 and they represented already 16 percent and so it went up and down. This is showing that people are changing their mind very quickly, something which they could not have imagined, they could not have had the idea of going somewhere, somehow they did it and today you can find Turks everywhere and I am sure that if there is a shop opening in space, they would also go there. So mobility has become a trend for the Turkish society, something that they didn't have before and in addition to the voluntary and people who went by their own will, there were also so-called forced migrants, people who were forced to flee. We have to keep something in mind that migration despite of all these trends is not the rule and that it is an exception. There is a great difference between the migration in the 19th century and the time after WWII. In the 19th century, people who decided to leave, just decided by themselves, they went and they cut off their paths, they burned off their bridges. They went and it's that time later when the Chicago School of Sociology developed the three-fold typology that the first generation is simply working for the next generation, the second generation is trying very quickly to learn the language and please their parents and it's the third generation who is integrating and at the same time assimilating. While that the chain finishes and you have suddenly a brand-new American citizen. Now this theory is no more valid, this is something of the past. I think that we have to keep this in mind, because this is exactly what the administrators, the politicians and the journalists of good intention are thinking that if they implement today integration policies they can do that no more, sorry, it's too late, the train has gone. There is no more possibility to do that, because first of all the world has changed. What we see is that migration is a part of globalization. Everybody is migrating and there is an acceleration in migration, in terms of volume. What is more important is that governments are bargaining about and it became a part of foreign policy. In the past it was demographers and geographers who were dealing with migration and they were sort of strange people somewhere in the University. Today, everybody has to be an expert in migration because in every field of public life you are confronted with migrant. Migration has become a part of feminization; women are playing a vital part in it.

This feminine migration is also involving the networks prostitution, human traffic, which is very tragic. Migration has become a part of politization, what today is required is governance in the EU. The member states of the EU would like to have a common policy of regulating the border situation and the implementation of the Schengen agreement. Finally, and that is also a proliferation of migration, transition, because countries which were purely countries of immigration like Poland, Mexico, South Korea, today have become double countries. On one side they are sending and on the other side people are coming and they don't know exactly what to do. So you see that this is something very different and therefore we first have to answer the question of the symposium. Is it, I mean is there a melting pot. My answer is no, it's not possible, neither melting pot nor salad bowl, because after the melting pot theory came the salad bowl, so you just mix everything together and you get a beautiful salad. Well, you don't get a beautiful salad, because people have their allegiances in a different way. People have attachments to a state with big names Germany, France, Austria and it's sometimes, to a region, to a city, to a district. If someone says my country is Kreuzberg then he means it. (Brubecker) pointed out in a statement that citizenship today is politics of nationhood. This is also passé. The question is not who gets what, but rather who is what. We live in a world where the demands for opening up the public crowd to differences involves including women, including immigrants, including blacks, including ethnic groups, religious groups. So there is an insistence on integrating new citizens in a different way. Therefore, the whole criteria of citizenship is not sufficient. It's not sufficient and that's why for me integration, I mean the goal of integration, the focus is wrong, because actually integration when it is spelled out is a form of disguised assimilation and I insist on this because on my way here to the conference I took a taxi cab. On coincidence it was a Turkish driver who has been here for twenty years and I asked him what sort of life he lives and he said that he is living a rather isolated life. I said why and as I said they mean integration as assimilation and he was exactly describing that process as I would do as an academician. I mean that's what people are feeling. I know that that's not the intention of these policies, but that's what people are feeling. Therefore, each migrant has a different allegiance and this different allegiance is translating itself what today the scholars are calling trans-nationalism, which means that loyalties are developed and these loyalties depend very much not only on the law but also on the culture. A young Turkish social scientist has published a book "The Hyphernation of Germans", well what he means with the hyphernated German is that in the past they were looking at a culture as a holistic concept, today they are looking at it as a syncretic one. The second approach is including the discussion of ethnicity and

language. The best thing to define this hypernated German is in a state of in-betweenness. This is how a Turkish writer who lives dozens of years in Germany describes it in one of his poems. He says "I gotta two worlds with me, but neither one hold. They are constantly bleeding. The border runs right across my tongue". In other words the transnational citizen lives in a new space which does not require to prefer one culture. It's not either Turkish or German, but and and and. The Berliner rapper is expressing this as such "We are no more sitting between the chairs. We have got a third one between the two". So this is the first thing I want to adress in my answer about the melting pot and now it takes me to the question of identity. In this question of identity, again, a number of social scientists have been writing about it and it is also related to the approach of diaspora. An analyst of postmodern view such as (Robin Cohen) suggests that the old essentialism, such as the Marxist idea that social identity could be reduced to class identity, are now redundant. This is no more the case. Hanno Kesken, a German philosopher in the 50s when he said that after the demise of the bi-polar world there will not be unity, but there will be diversity and this diversity is here. Today there is not only a controversy between Europe and the countries that are outside of Europe, but also between Europe and Islam. If we don't accept this new concept it will be very difficult to accommodate secularism and Islamism, but I believe and in Turkey also we are on our way to accommodate both. The likeness of this prediction remains open. There are two things which we have to answer. First, is the EU acting as a melting pot? B, does it give way to European identity. Under the light of what I have explained I think that it is no more possible that the EU, Europe can act as a melting pot. The migrants of all kind who have come to Europe have not the intention to burn their bridges. They would like to keep them, but on the contrary they nurture ties to their home country at the same time they form allegiances to their new country. They follow the news at home while keeping an eye on the EU stock market. They celebrate their holidays on a different date, I mean they celebrate Christmas on the New Year and for them the word Noel, Weihnachten mean Silvester. They have invented this and you can see all over Istanbul Christmas trees and every single window burning, but not on the 24th of December, but on the 31st. Now this is what they have produced. Now they participate in local...I mean when I say in Istanbul, they do that in Germany as well, they celebrate their Christmas on Silvester...They participate in local elections, whether they have the right to vote or not, because they are very much interested to know who is going to be the head men in their home village in home, wherever. They no more buy property in Turkey, they buy it in Europe but at the same time some share in Turkey. Now, when they are working they are at home in Europe, when they go on vacation they are at home at

home. Now which one is the home? Are they both their home? So, they represent a new type. The type of floating in the economical, political and cultural room and these are the Euro-Turks of today. These Euro-Turks are not the rule, they are the minority and I acknowledge that we still have nationalists, fanatics, Islamists who want to convince Europe that Islam is a better religion than Christianity, but these are the people of today and the past. The ones of the future are going to be those transnational citizens and the more they are going up there will be more of them. Finally we have not to forget that in order to get these Euro-Turks I mean getting larger we also, they also have to address themselves to the problem of the position of women. Now I am totally aware that regardless of whatever, we claim that Turkey as the only secular republic in the Muslim world has given all the rights to its women by accepting in totality of the Swiss civil code back in 1920. Now the Swiss civil code is in force for over 70 years, but still if we look at the present in Europe, what do we see, killing, intra-familial violence, fraud and horrible actions. Obviously those things are happening and I don't want to beautify, I don't want to give a rosy picture here that everything is settled. What is important here is that to the degree that supportive help is given to women and not only well-educated women, but women of mother's origin, they make use of it and when you read in the newspaper that the Turkish chamber of commerce has elected five women who made use of the mini-credit. The mini-credit skill, you know, very limited skill, well these are women, one of them has established a hairdresser shop, but she is employing already four people. They pay back their money. They are very conscience of not... And there is this example of a mother of four children, she has divorced, she was saying that she doesn't want to put anymore up with violence in family and she is going to make her own business and going her own path. These are simple women, but they are also very sophisticated. Amongst the 500 richest persons of the world they are also including one Turkish woman, who is the chief executive of very huge concern for industrial investments. At the same time she has a hobby, she is cultivating wine which means that whether or not alcohol drinking is forbidden or not, I mean she give the tone. I think I have talked enough, but I want to close with an incident which I think is very significant and it's a diplomatic gesture. A few months ago in Belgrad, the Turkish ambassador was invited to a function commemorating the restaurant of a public monument. He was approached by the major of the city. The major said "We would be very honoured if you could come to our ceremony on the 26th of January. We are going to celebrate the 300 anniversary of the treaty of Kallofschka. Now the treaty of Kallofschka has been the first treaty when this decline of the Roman Empire started when the four states signaturing this paper were Italy, Austria, Venice, Ottoman

Empire. To make this ceremony at the time they had put up a big tent and the tent had four different entrances. The representatives came all at the same time from each door. Later they constructed a church. In this church and the direction pointing to the East, the entrance, was totally closed up with a wall, because they decided that they don't want the Turks coming once more back. For 300 years that wall was closed. Our ambassador said "I accept very well your invitation, I have one condition, if you open the wall, I will come". Indeed on January the 26th 2009 our ambassador went, the wall was taken down, he passed it and by passing he entered Europe. This is a symbol and I hope it will become true even if I don't live long enough. I am sure some day we are going to sing "Freude, Freude...".

Hans Rauscher:

Thank you. Thank you very much for this fascinating picture. What you are saying is forget about integration, forget about assimilation, get used to floating new citizens between in a sort of limbo. I have to think about that but it's obviously a very new idea and probably a phenomenon which went on right under our noses and we didn't notice it. Switzerland, I think, has an even higher percentage of Turkish citizens than Austria. Please give us your thoughts on European identity.

Prof. Goetschel

Thank you very much. Those of you who studied the history of this program very closely might have noticed that actually Georg Kreis, a historian, was supposed to sit on this panel and unfortunately he wasn't able to make it and as I was supposed to be here anyway because I am also on the panel tomorrow I accepted with pleasure to also sit here. He sent me his notes and I dared to enrich them with some of my own thoughts and thinking on the other side I cut out some of his reflection in order not to overstretch our limited time. And I'll try to be rather short in general. If we talk about identity and I am now also incorporating some views that we have inside Switzerland but also at Europe and as it also, as a political scientist now and not as a historian, I think we have to be aware of the fact that there is an insight problematic about identity thinking about what we think our identity is as Swiss, as Austrians, as Europeans, whatever this exactly means. I think part of this identity was also from the respective third parties, other have of what we are or of what they think that we should be or we are not. I will try to say something on both of these aspects. Now looking at the inside aspect first. There is the whole idea and it was raised with a question just before lunchtime and it was what do we understand when we talk

about the European identity and even in larger when we talk about identity as such. Don't be afraid, I won't even dare to answer this question in a general way. I just try right now to bring in three different concepts which could be associated with this notion of political identity referring of course to different discourses which are led of course with regard to different European issue.

First of all, identity as a public space, as a public discourse space, as a public political space. This refers to the issue of course language, it refers to the issue of common media, it refers to the issue of common culture and we all agree that Europe be it within the EU be it outside the EU does not fit this notion of public space. This is also one of the main reasons which is usually brought in when we talk about the issue of democracy in Europe, and when we try to explain, to understand sometime to justify why there isn't more democracy, I wouldn't say direct democracy, that would be a too narrow Swiss perspective, but more democracy in general, because it is not possible for people to discuss about Europe according to their usage, to their language, to their media, to their way of discussing political issues over their borders. Sometimes they even have difficulties discussing it within their borders but I am not mentioning any specific country right now. So this is this first concept of public space, political space. Then we have a second concept, which is included in the title of this panel which has already been mentioned which is melting pot. Same that a little bit linked to the concept I have explained before, if you want to have public space and political space we need to melt. We don't need to all fall in love with each other, but we need to melt in a political and identity way. The question here is, I mean, can this ever be an objective, was it ever an objective. In this regard the USA are often mentioned as an example. It is also used semantically when we say well we will become the US of Europe. I just happened to have spent one month in New York because I was on a sabbatical leave, well being aware that New York isn't the United States but well is a part of the United States. Building on this very personal experience, but I think also on more general observations regarding the situation in the US, when we think about the US as they exist as a vision for Europe we have to be aware of the US is by no way a melting pot. The US is a society depending of course on where we are exactly where there is a lot of mutual acceptance and mutual tolerance of different identities, ethnic groups which coexist there. This tolerance, this acceptance exists beyond political reflections. A very small example as our moderator also asked us to be close to daily life, In NY for example if the streets or the floors are being cleaned and there are those plastic elements that tell people to be careful because it's wet and they might slip, it's always bilingual, it's always English and Spanish. Why? I am not aware of huge debates which would have

taken place about if they should or should not. In Switzerland we would have a major debate about this, but it's true that we already have a couple of own national languages there so it might be reason of space, but anyway, I mean, these are the elements present in daily life. If you are on the subway you get the ads depending on the line of the subway you are in. It is only in Spanish. It just happened to be there. I myself lived in a quarter which made me feel really like I was in the Dominican Republic. Everything was from the Dominican Republic. It was also a little bit cheaper to live there. So you can travel within one city from one city to another from one cultural space to another. It doesn't mean necessarily all, how to say, heavily rooted people in this Anglo-Irish tradition would have to want to live in this place where it's mainly Dominican or vice versa. But there is the openness and the tolerance to live in these different places. I think when we think about the melting pot as it might exist in daily life we have to think about this element of tolerance of mutual acceptance, even of people not being far away like the Africans we all like, Asian people or whoever, but we have to be ready. They are here in our immediate neighbourhood. This is something which is of course important at the European level, but it is also something that first and foremost starts at our own local, regional, national level. It is important within states like Switzerland. It is important within states like Turkey. This is also an issue which could be discussed maybe here later on. This is also an issue in states like Austria, as we happen to be in Linz. We all know that all these states that I mentioned by chance as they are also relevant at this conference, where I think we could start thinking at the very local level and concrete level before starting to think about visions which do exist or do not exist about Europe. And the third possible concept of thinking about identity is what can be called project identity. What is meant with this? It is meant that living a little bit the more or less abstract notions of political identity we could also think about identity flowing out progressively, pragmatically, out of common values, and out of common objectives. Speaking of common values, one of the introducing speakers this morning mentioned the element that there are now common human rights, common human democracy elements accepted, at least verbally, I am not saying it's implemented perfectly, but at least verbally at high political level in all European countries. This is a start, this is a start on which certain things can be built. Second, and from my perspective more important, we have different objectives, objectives at a policy level. Objectives regarding environmental policy, regarding social policy, regarding even foreign policy, which exists and now I am moving in the European framework of course, because these policies don't exist at least not outside the EU. With the last example, the foreign policy I am getting to the other side which would be much shorter than what I just said before. It's

Europe's position in the world and I know that there are going to be discussions tomorrow and I wouldn't anticipate those on this panel, this wouldn't be too friendly. But still, outside of legal treaty revisions, some of you might be aware that it has been talked a lot about getting European's foreign and security policy more powerful, more efficient through different types of treaty revisions, having a foreign minister – yes or no, having majority decisions – yes or no. I think this is completely irrelevant. It's completely irrelevant because when it comes to tricky, to really important or political foreign policy or security policy, there has to be some kind of common foreign or security policy identity among the European states and basically also among the European populations, when we talk about the policy of Europe toward different conflicts in the world toward the Middle Eastern conflict as an example. As long as there is no position in this field there won't be a common perception of Europe as an actor in this world. This is not something which can be decided top-down with whatever treaty or revision, this is something which has come bottom-up. We may also look at one of the other policy fields, just to mention them, we may also look at asylum and migration, how Europe behaves in this regard. If coherent or not, this is one element, but what essence what values are carried within this policy field, this is the important element. Also in the issue of environmental policy, looking at the Kyoto protocol or the follow up. These are elements which will finally be very important on how coherent, how strong and how identity-based Europe will be seen in the world.

Summing up and coming to the end, I think that with the examples I mentioned, one can see that certain elements of a European identity have already been achieved, that much is going on and that even more remains to be achieved, but this cannot be decided among politicians this has to evolve among daily practise from daily citizens bottom-up with still some decades to go.

Hans Rauscher:

Thank you very much. Sorry, about the time. Prof. Bakke your thoughts and ideas please. We'll try to squeeze in two or three questions at the end.

Elisabeth Bakke:

Yes, thank you, I need this microphone to work, because my voice is really bad, I apologize for that. First, I would like to thank you for inviting me to this symposium. We have been asked to discuss the concept of European identity and whether or not the EU acts as a melting pot and gives birth to social distinct identity, this quote from the program.

As I think, several of the others already mentioned this is actually two questions and my answer to the second question would be yes, the EU is forming but the precise contents of it are still contested, it does not comprise more than 50 percent of the population at the moment and the geographical variation across Europe is still large. My answer to the first question on the contrary would have to be no, the EU does not act as a melting pot or if it does so it does only to a very limited degree. The melting pot metaphor really suggests that people coming from different backgrounds merge into a larger pool and thereby lose their distinctive feature in the process. That sort of implies that people have migrated to Europe from some place, but that's not the case here. If we put the migrants from other places aside in the EU countries as such, on average only 3.5 percent of the people come from other European states. That means that the very large majority of the population actually stays at home. There is no reason to expect a melting pot phenomenon to occur for that reason. Also this melting pot thing is clearly not what is happening in Europe, European identity is not replacing other identities whether a nation or other in the EU member states, it adds an extra layer really. Let me return a little to the concept of European identity. European identity would be what we call a collective identity and like any other collective identity requires subjective identification on part of the Europeans. This means that the majority of the population would have to have shared feeling of belonging together as a group. Second, a European identity also requires that Europeans have something in common that can be used to distinguish us Europeans from the others. This does not necessarily mean an essentialist concept or identity since any nation forming process involves a lot of forgetting. It really means that there must be something that can be used as criteria for inclusion and exclusion. Regarding the question of subjective identity, about 50 percent of the population in the EU member states feel fierily attached or very attached to the EU. And about 55 percent think of themselves as Europeans at least sometimes, but even in the oldest member states only a small minority has a primary European identity according to the latest Eurobarometer where the question of European versus national identity was asked only 3 percent of the EU defined themselves as Europeans only and another 7 percent put their identity as Europeans first and the national identity second. In other words, the strength of the European identity is clearly no match for regional, national or local identities. People in Europe still see themselves as members of nations first and Europeans second, if at all. But then again, young people and educated people feel more European than the others so perhaps in some fifty years or so we will see some change in this respect. Second, as to the question of what Europeans have in common, the thing about complex identity is that these

contents are often contested and they change over time. The contents of the European identity are all more elusive since the criteria of inclusion or exclusion depend on where we draw the border, whether we look at it today or more historically. The problem is that all the usual suspects tend rather to divide Europe than to unite Europe. That are things like religion, language, culture, not to mention history. Most wars that have involved European powers have been internal European wars, actually. The wars against the Ottoman Empire do of course form an exception, but where does this leave Turkey. How can the EU emphasise Christianity and still admit Turkey or even Bosnia to the European Union. I think the only way to talk about a shared European culture besides Christianity would be to talk about an elite culture, music, the fine arts, the architecture, perhaps the old Latin scholarly community, but mostly this is in the past and besides what appeal would it have to the ordinary citizen in Europe today. Alternatively, the European identity can be based on shared European values like the EU often do like democracy, the rule of law, and market economy. But then if we look at this historically, no European country was actually democratic before 1906 when Finland as the first country gave the women the right to vote in national elections. Before that no country in Europe was democratic. A lot of the countries that are members of the European Union today were not democratic until the 1990s, so obviously this is very contemporary conceptions of what it means to be European. If you ask the Europeans what creates the feeling of community 27 percent answer culture, 27 percent economy, 21 percent history, 20 sports and 20 percent values. Only 13 percent mention religion as important and 12 percent the welfare states, the latter point is of interest from a Norwegian point of view of course. Finally, very shortly to the borders, the title of this symposium is Extra Europa and the question to what extent the three countries in question are outside Europe. Obviously we are all outside the European Union and to the extent that we all accept the hegemonic idea that Europe is confined to the EU we are outside Europe. If you look at it historically Switzerland was always a part of Europe of course, Norway always belonged to the wild north as opposed to the cultured European South. But since the 18th century the main dividing line in Europe has been within the civilized European West and the barbarian East, beyond which lay non Europe. The Eastern borders of Europe had been much more contested than the Western borders. Turkey was historically really not regarded as a part of Europe. On the contrary, Turkey or rather its predecessors were Europe's important other, the very entity that Europe defined itself against. First phrased itself of the then in terms of the (oiled) then in terms of the Muslims and finally in term of the barbarians. So Europe was then civilised Christian west. So again if you ask the European a large majority were in favour of Swiss and Norwegian

membership, two thirds are against Turkish membership. The majority in fact agreed that Turkey belong to Europe in term of geography, but not that Turkey belongs to Europe in terms of history and sixty percent believe that the differences are too great to allow Turkey in. A very large majority think that Turkey would have to improve its human rights records and its economy to join. So what does this tell us about European identity? I think the answers of the Europeans in this Eurobarometer confirm that although there is no consensus on the topic of European identity, peoples' exclusion criteria nevertheless is seen quite clear – we should not allow anybody in that we accept as too different from us in terms of culture and history and in terms of values, especially in terms of human rights and in terms of economy and that is what you can read out of it, that's what I make out of it.

Hans Rauscher:

Thank you. Now, for some questions, please.

Male speaker from the audience#1:

Thank you. Hello, my name is (Osam Osasarch) and I am from Turkey. We have been participating in the European parliament delegation and during the conference our topic is European identity and accession of Turkey to the European Union. While we were waiting for a full membership to the EU there's a cultural melting at the same time in Turkey as if the EU is pushing the Turkish culture to fit in the framework that it has created. What kind of precautions must be taken to interrupt that kind of cultural assimilation as the EU is causing damage to our own culture? Thank you.

Hans Rauscher:

Thank you. Please.

Male speaker from the audience#2:

May I add to your decline. I think Europe is already definite. We have you forget, and I think you forget the arrogance of the EU, we have one organisation with 47 European countries, that is the council of Europe. We have inside of this organisation the human rights court, five pieces. This is one of the common values, Europe, geographically from the south Caucasian area, Turkey, up to Iceland from Siberia if you like down to Portugal. We have inside the council of Europe also a cultural committee, which deals with common questions, even with the definition. So, Europe exists already. We have the EU, of course

we are now in Linz, the European capital, 27 and outside in fact 20 more countries. We talk now about cultural identity inside only of the EU and try to avoid, or some countries try to avoid membership of other countries like, you are quite right, what's the question of Bosnia-Herzegovina even. If you go to some cities totally oriented to the West, not to Asia. Melting pot. No. No melting pot. We have in the European Union article 151 subsidiarily principle guarantee that it is up to the countries, that culture belongs to the member countries. We have now since one year or one and a half year UNESCO invention of a cultural diversity protection and promotion of freedom of expression. Article 2 in this convention: each country has the right to define her own cultural policy. Members, not all European Union countries are member of the convention even extraordinary the European Union, the commission, this is really for UNESCO extraordinary that the commission is also a member, So we have also for the future, there is only one for a melting pot, this are the new technologies. If we via internet and so on there can be aggraded a certain kind of a melting pot. This is one danger. I think, well, I have to add so many I agree totally what you have also said. But I think already that Turkey is inside Europe. The council for Europe is the first organization after WWII and Turkey joined, they had an agreement and Turkey accepted all the rules for it. What I am missing of the council, of the whole discussion about the EU is the lack of corporate identity of this firm. The first corporate identity was the European Youth Orchestra and two more activities. Now finally the budget, hear it, the cultural budget of the EU is 0.02 promille. Here you have the answer.

Hans Rauscher:

Okay, another last question.

Female speaker from the audience#3:

During you intervention you mentioned that part of the European identity were the values and you mentioned also liaison (Hans Rauscher: The what?) the secularity. When coming to Austria in "Financial Times", I read some new about, let me not say who said it, but is reads like "You should defend African family from the dangers of modernity and secularisation and to spare the poor from the impact of globalization", this is by a European leader, (Hans Rauscher: I think this was..) the pope.

Hans Rauscher:

Okay, may I comment on this very freely. Austria is supposed to be a catholic country, supposed to be. Church goers are about 10 percent at most and I think even less, an even

smaller percentage, takes serious what the pope says. Really, you have to believe me the religion is for most Austrians I would say a cultural affair, not an affair of the heart or of believe. There is a very strong, within the Catholic Church, there is a very strong liberal and modernist strain, no doubt about that. These are on the basis, but on the whole Austria already is a leucistic country almost a bagan country. So, don't worry.

Female speaker from the audience#3:

I am not trying to challenge Austria.

Hans Rauscher:

Not like Poland for instance. Poland is the glaring opposite.

Female speaker from the audience#3:

No, I was a within the context of European identity, I am not trying to challenge Austria, religion-wise.

Hans Rauscher:

Well, but as I said and what could be proved by studies and by poll, religious, the real religious life is vanishing, not vanishing, but it is getting weaker and weaker among Christean European. It is not getting weaker among Islamic Europeans and I think this is a cultural divide. Islamic Europeans take religion much more serious than the other one.

May I add, because we are already running out of time, may I add two more thoughts. Some sort of cultural identity, European identity might be fund among the British pensioner sitting half of the year in Spain and the German or Austrian pensioner also sitting half of the year in Mallorca or in Turkey and the student starveling between all the European capital cities and the so-called second cities and on the other hand might be found among those young Turks and other floating people who sit on the third chair, which is a very fitting example, a very fitting wording. And for you Sir, oh, he already left, okay, he already left, yes, as a (abachan) is in the European council but I wouldn't dare to make the proof as (abachan) on European rights and law. This is what most of us here agreed that European identity comes to a very large percentage comes democracy, human rights, etcetera.

Male speaker from the audience#1 again:

Can Mrs. Nermin answer my question, please.

Hans Rauscher:

I didn't get it, can someone please...

Female voice from the audience#4:

Mrs. Abadan, he wants Mrs Abadan.

Hans Rauscher:

Yes, please. Could you please rephrase your question.

Male speaker from the audience#1 again:

While we are waiting for full membership to the European Union, there is a cultural melting at the same time in Turkey as if the European Union created a criteria to pushing Turkey in the criteria that it has created. What kind of precautions must be taken to interrupt that kind of cultural assimilation as the EU is causing damage to our own culture? That's the question.

Nermin Abadan-Unat:

I couldn't understand the question because I don't hear so well.

Hans Rauscher:

Sorry, I have to be a bit of a dictator. She will answer your question, but outside, because we are already a bit late, and you can tell it to your friends.