

PANEL E – THREATS AND CHALLENGES TO EUROPEAN SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY

Chair: Otmar Lahodynsky, profil

Panellists: Heinz Gärtner, OIIP (AT); René Schwok, University of Geneva (CH); Meltem Müftüler-Baç, Sabanci University (TR); Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen, FFI Norway.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

So, let me, again, welcome you all here at this panel about foreign and security policy. Let me shortly introduce myself. I'm a journalist for *Profil* magazine, which is Austria's news magazine, and my expertise is in European Union affairs; I've been in Brussels for seven years covering EU matters there and also NATO.

Well, if you let me just give a very short introduction to the topic. As I mentioned just Brussels, I remember always a Belgian foreign minister, who might not be known to you, but his name is Mark Eyskens, and he used to use a very famous pun, so to say. As he said: the European Union is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and in the military and security field it's even worse, it's a worm. This was about fifteen years ago, but I think things have changed since then. You might have followed it, there were all -- I don't want to bother you with EU treaty history -- but you know there have been some improvements. We will have, if the Lisbon Treaty will be finalised, maybe, hopefully this year, if Ireland says yes, and also the Czech Republic will say yes, then we will have also, for the first time, a Foreign Minister of the European Union. So finally we will have somebody really to call from the States or from Russia or from whatever power or whatever, to call when there is a problem because you know Henry Kissinger used to say: what is this thing called European community, I don't even have a telephone number where to call if I have any questions to ask. So this might be solved then.

Of course, we will talk, hopefully, also today about current security threats which are on the table and might face in the twenty-first century. There is still a very unclear picture of the division of tasks between NATO and the European Union, although we have now in the building-up an own European military corps. You know there is a Rapid Reaction Force building up; we have the so-called Battle Groups forming, which should be ready from this year till the next five years, which will handle political, military conflicts in the neighbourhood.

The European Union is maybe no longer a worm because in the military field we are now, in European Union, made several operations, just to mention Macedonia, we had a Peace Keeping mission; we had a mission in Bosnia now, not only now but a few years ago; we have even in further away regions like Africa, in Chad and also in Indonesia. So Europe is catching up, so to say, and also the old split which used to be in the Bush administration between the old and new Europe has been somehow overcome. Not still, I think there are still some rifts still visible and now with the new US President Obama, we will talk about where could be the changes, also in the transatlantic relations. Obama will be in Europe on the fourth and fifth of April, and before in London at the G20 meeting, but he will be, he will give a speech in Strasbourg and in Prague on the fifth of April and we will see what he has to say to his European partners. I guess he will ask for more help from the European allies, especially for the operation in Afghanistan.

Well, so let me just introduce the panel first. To my left side, we have Professor Doctor Meltem Müftüler Baç (I hope I pronounce it correctly). She is professor of International Relations at the Sabanci University, very famous University in Istanbul, and she also used to work in the United States. She was also a Fulbright fellow at the University in Chicago and she is a Jean Monnet professor and got this prestigious title from the European Commission in 2004.

And later, on the right hand side, from your side, it's Doctor Rene Schwok. He is the holder of the Jean Monnet chair at the Institute of European Studies at the University of Geneva and also lectures at the department of political science and he is, since 2008, he is also President of the European Community Studies Association of Switzerland and wrote a couple of books. Just to mention one, it's about Switzerland and the European Union, a rather new book, which will come out also in English soon and was published in German language.

And to my right hand side, from yours to the left, I say welcome to Professor Heinz Gärtner, who might be known to some of you, he is a very distinguished scientist for political sciences in Austria and is there working at the Austrian Institute for International Affairs, a very distinguished institute with wonderful papers, if I may say so. He was also visiting the United States and other universities in Europe, and also he was a Fulbright professor, recently only, at the Stanford University in last summer and fall. And recently, he published a book about the new President of the United States, Mr. Obama, and you will find some

leaflets outside. The book has been published in German and there might be translations soon.

And last, not least, our guest from Norway is Mr. Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen. He's also a political scientist at the University of Oslo but also used to work at the University of Cambridge. He is a lecturer at the Norwegian Military Academy, as I see in your CV, so he is also an expert in the security policy. He also wrote a couple of books and publications, for instance one of the last publications is a book called *Who speaks for Europe while we wait for the EU Foreign Minister?*

So that's a very recent topic, so to say, and because you know we still have not a real EU foreign minister, so we have several people speaking on EU foreign and security policy. Only yesterday, we had the foreign ministers at the summit in Brussels. Well, so I may give the floor first to our distinguished guest from Istanbul.

Meltem Müftüleri-Baç:

Thank you. I'll be talking about the European security challenges from the perspective of the Turkish Ascension negotiations. I have given a copy of the text, so you can find it in the magazine outside. It has a strange bird sitting on top of it, it's on page 45.

Now, Turkey began its ascension negotiations with the European Union on October 3 2005 and this has been regarded by many of us who are working on the European Union from an academic perspective or who are policy makers on the European Union, from the point of view that this is now going to have a major impact on the European Unions role as an international actor on the none hand and then on the European security on the other hand and also with respect to the Turkish internal transformation. I'm not going to go too much into the impact that the ascension negotiations have on Turkish internal transformation, but we can do that in the question and answer period.

So what do we mean by the European Union as an international actor? Now one of the things that we have, so far, covered in the literature is that European Union is not going to be like the United States. It's not going to become apparently a hard power, precisely because it's composed of currently of 27 member states. The second pillar of the European integration is an intergovernmental pillar, even though, you know, there are certain new measures towards it, it still is very much intergovernmental, and the divergent preferences of the member states, of which some of them are NATO members, some of them are neu-

tral, some of them are just newcomers into the security business completely. These divergent preferences between the member states that make up the European Union is making the European Union's move onto a deeper, let's say, security measure, onto something like becoming an hard power, much more difficult. But at the same time the European Union still has significant roles with respect to how it conducts foreign policy and the enlightened process of the recent round of enlargement and ongoing enlargement right now with Turkey and Croatia and possibly towards the western Balkan some time in the future is an important tool for EU foreign policy making. Now when the EU makes policy, it's not only for dealing with only the external security threats but also with respect to internal security threats that might emerge inside the European Union. So before we go into analysis of what kind of role the European Union has as an international actor and how Turkey impacts that role, maybe we should identify some of these external and internal threats and challenges to European security. Now when you are straight in the middle of Europe, in a place like as such, as for example Austria, it might be harder to perceive that there are security risks that come from one's geographical proximity or it might even be hard to conceive that a possibility of war still is there. The most recent adventure of Russia with respect to Georgia or the ongoing intervention in Iraq, the Gaza conflict, these are all things that you know, we feel very strongly in Turkey, you know, where war is almost always very close by geographically, it's there going on, and at the same time it's something that you actually have to prepare. One of my favourite sayings which the European Union doesn't actually feel it as such is from Kenneth Waltz, who is this neorealist thinker, basically he stated that war happens because there is nothing to prevent it, and if you want peace, then you have to prepare for war. Now these are things that have become very foreign to the European Union over the past decade because the EU after World War II has chosen a more functional path to integration and has made war materially unthinkable inside the European continent. But war happens outside. And it's most often an everyday occurrence for people who are either on the periphery of Europe such as those people on the western Balkans, or when you come close to geographical proximity where Turkey is located it's something that happens around Turkey. So when we try to understand external challenges, aggression is still there but now we also have in the post 9/11 period, threats to security which we have not felt before at the global level, which for example the realist thinking of international relations didn't prepare us for, which is that the logic that threats to security come from states, traditionally, is no longer there. So we now have a new form of a security threat, which 9/11 and then the London and the Madrid and Istanbul bombings have demonstrated after that, that terrorism is a very much strong threat to security at large, both at the global level, but also for the European Union as well. Now these security

risks that we identify as, let's say, terrorism, is no longer the security risks that could be met with traditional tools that we had, such as let's say deterrence, or the tools that we developed against other states. Because terrorism is something that emerges inside states from let's say non-state actors or trans-national actors such as Al Qaeda. So when you look at the responses that the European Union is trying to develop towards them, militarily they are not doing much. But at the same time, the adoption of the security strategy document by Javier Solana, by the European Union but prepared by Javier Solana in December 2003, is identifying these security threats. Now if these are the security threats, or the security challenges let's say that we are you know preparing ourselves for, what kind of a role does Turkey play in that aspect? is the second question. Now the question that I posed as such could be answered in two different ways. One, we could argue that the military capabilities of Turkey, the geographical proximity of Turkey to these areas where there is ongoing conflict forms a very concrete material benefit for European security that the EU has to acknowledge. But on the other hand there is an equally important aspect of the normative side of Turkish ascension. Now because Turkey is predominantly a Muslim country, and why this, even though I don't like the, I don't like Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations and Knowledge*, or I don't like to emphasise the speech role, but we have acknowledge the fact that Turkey can talk to the Europeans on a credible basis and Turkey can talk to the middle easterners on the same basis. So the fact that Turkey could actually have good relations with both sides and is able to bring both sides together on a common platform is an important aspect of bringing Europe and let's say middle easterners together around a common understanding which would eventually lessen the impact of the security threats that we might be feeling. Now, why is this important? Why should we talk about let's say Turkey's impact on European security or how Turkey could respond to these new security threats and challenges? That's directly because of the enlargement process. When the European Union embarks on an enlargement process, there are different ways of approaching it. We could argue that the European Union enlarges because of the perceived material costs and benefits of enlargement. So if we approach enlargement from let's say a totalitarian perspective, from a rational intergovernmental perspective and emphasise the utility impact of enlargement, then we have go into an analysis of what kind of expected material costs and what kind of expected material benefits can a country bring to the European Union? Now in that type of an equation, we are aware that Turkey brings significant material benefits to the European Union's security, but that doesn't mean that there are some kind of let's say weak points here. You could easily argue that yes, but Turkey is geographically located in one of the most dangerous parts of the world. The fact that Turkey is not an integral part of the European Union so far might bring Turkey, might

bring the European Union to this area. Sarkozy, for example, the French president, had said something very interesting last year. He said, I wouldn't be able to explain to the French school kids why the borders of the European Union are on Syria. Now, I can easily answer the French president because these are the areas where the European Union will have to react to in order to stabilise the European Union. And this is actually also said by like for example Joschka Fischer when he was foreign minister, he said if you want our children and grandchildren to live in peace in Europe, then Turkey has to become a member of the European Union. Now, these two different kinds of perspective, one from Sarkozy the other from Joschka Fischer for example is very important to illustrate the point that I raised at the beginning, that is, the European Union does not still of course talk with a unified voice in foreign policy. There are diverging preferences between member states, which in return makes both second period integration very problematic, but at the same time even poses obstacles in an enlargement process such as the one with the Turkish ascension negotiations, even poses serious obstacles to, how that process is going to proceed. So the bottom line that we have here is that security threats in the European Union's future in security integration is to a large, would to a large extent be benefiting from Turkish ascension, because of the Turkish experience in NATO because of the Turkish military capabilities, but more precisely because of the normative impact of Turkish ascension.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

it was very interesting to hear your perspective because, as you mention, in Europe and especially in many European countries, the citizens think, as you imagine, that with Turkey's ascension the foreign external borders of the European Union might be bordering dangerous zones, countries, like Syria, Iraq and Iran. But you talked about the advantages that also you have huge military capabilities so you would introduce also a huge military force to the European Union. And if you allow just one short anecdote as you mentioned hesitance in the European Union, Mr Sarkozy, it wasn't always so. In the sixties, Mr. Spaak, who was the former Belgian prime minister, and he said when this trade ascension customs Union Treaty was established, the first trade association agreement, customs was later in the seventies. He said, I'm looking forward to the day when the highest mountain of the Europe community won't be the Mont Blanc but the Ararat; the Ararat Mountain in east Anatolia, which is a bit higher than the Mont Blanc.

Ok. We stay to the NATO countries if you allow and we switch over to Norway, also a NATO country, but works together with the European Union in the foreign policy a lot. You will find a brochure outside where you can read about the different corporations, Norway

takes also part in the European economic area and therefore is very linked to the EU, also Schengen. But Mr. Norheim-Martinsen, maybe you could talk also about a threat which maybe your country your citizens, are especially sensitive to, that would be the climate change because you are very close to the arctic region and you also, the northern part is the arctic region, so maybe you can elaborate a little bit on this threat as well.

Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen:

Well, I'm not sure if I can say too much about climate security but I can say quite a lot about energy security. First of all, thank you for the opportunity to address the audience and for the invitation. Currently I work for an institution called the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, and studying the EU at a defence research establishment in a non-EU member state doesn't really come across as the most obvious thing to do. You might even wonder why I was employed by them to do that. But still, European security and defence policy, now ten years old, has become one of the most important policy areas for the Union. They have carried out more than twenty crisis management operations, civilian and military. It might even have developed some kind of strategic or security culture, or security identity, along the way, the European security strategy from 2003 being an important element of that. And of course Norway also in this area is probably the most active non-EU member involved in the EU. And I shall talk you through some of the areas where Norway has been involved in ESDP politics and I will move on to talk about what Norway's strategic or security interest would be and what EU can do for us and what we can do for the EU in that sense.

Today, Norway has participated in a number of ESDP operations. We participated with military personnel in Macedonia and in Bosnia. We are currently involved in the police operation in Afghanistan with seven police officers. We are involved in the EUR-LEX, the judiciary operation in Kosovo with eight police officers and one judge. In addition we will send one frigate to the EU's anti-piracy operation outside Somalia this summer. Norway also participated in the Nordic Battlegroup, which was one of the EU's battle groups on standby for the first half of 2008. The other members of that battle group was Sweden, Ireland, Finland and Estonia. So we were the only non-EU member part of that. One might say that this was perhaps a bit more controversial than the kind of involvement we had in earlier ESDP operations, mainly because this is a standing force and it has very short standby period as well. So in that sense, there was some debate on this issue in Norwegian parliament, considering the fact that we would almost be turning over sovereignty of our military forces to an organisation that we're not members of and we have no decision-

making powers. But in reality I would say that debate of participation in the ESDP participation and in the Nordic Battlegroup at all was very small.

And that has also been one of the main features of our participation in the European security and defence policy: the fact that we have had almost no democratic scrutiny and almost no public scrutiny. It seems like the sentiment has always been that if we're allowed to play along, we should do so. That's why we have participated in this thing. You might also say that the EU has earned quite a lot of legitimacy when it comes to entering the military domain, which means that a country like Sweden and a country like Ireland, former neutrals, are also allowed to be members of the standing military force. That was the first time Sweden did that and that was almost without debate in Sweden as well.

Finally, Norway is also an associate partner of the European Defence Agency, which is an agency which is supposed to streamline armaments, combat cooperation in Europe and also consolidate the European defence industry. It took more than one year of hard lobbying for Norway to become part of this organisation and you might say that it was a bit of stroke to Norway to actually have to fight for this because we tend to think that we have a rather privileged relationship with the EU, in all policy areas. But this time, quite a lot of EU-member states, including Britain, basically said that, no, if we are to let other people in on the EDA, we should let them in as a package, which meant that, for example, Turkey would also be a member. But of course, after one year of debating this issue with Greece and Turkey, with Greece and Cyprus being part of the European Union, we ended up with securing an associate impartial agreement with this one. So, this might reflect the fact that Norway tends to value the EU more than the EU values us. So in other words, Norway has been more than a willing partner in European security and defence policy, while our influence on the EU remains limited at best, I would say. So what does Norway stand to gain from participation in the ESDP then? Of course, then we have to move to what our strategic interests are. Our main strategic interest at the time is the High North and the Barents region, which is also reflected in the government's new Northern Strategy (it was released only a week ago). This reflects the fact that, I mean, during the Cold War, Norway was the important flank, in military terms. Now we're just the periphery. We're the wealthy periphery, you might say. So what is at stake in the High North is oil, gas, as well as our fisheries. These are not security interests in the traditional sense, in as far as they are not subject to any military threat. They also remain highly potential in the sense that these are oil and gas resources that have yet to be exploited. They also have yet to be confirmed absolutely in terms of how much we are talking about. Optimistic estimates suggest that about

25 percent of the world's remaining oil and gas resources are to be found in the arctic region, which of course includes Canada and the high High North and everything.

But still, most of these resources are to found on the Russian side, some of them are to be found on the Norwegian side, while quite a lot of it is also to be found in disputed areas in between Russia and Norway, including the island of Svalbard. So there are potential future sources of political conflict or economic conflict here that may, and I repeat, that may, lead to some display of military force by Russia. There we're talking display of military force in terms of gunboat diplomacy, we're not talking about armed conflict. So we're not talking about any kind of conflict that would invoke collective defence commitments by NATO or by the EU if it ever was to lead to that. These are interests that Norway would have to deal with alone. That's also why we need to have a strong navy and a strong presence in the High North, as the government has said.

In fact, energy security, which is the talk of the day, is a very elusive term. What does it mean? For the EU, energy security is a matter of security of supply. And the EU will therefore rather indiscriminately impose on every partner a pressure to actually start exploiting these kind of resources, whether it be Norway or whether it be Russia. So in that sense you might say that the strategic interest or the security interest of Norway in this region doesn't really converge with the European interests. If we were to stay outside European Union, that is, and I shall not comment with any advice as to whether we should become a member based on that, or perhaps I actually did now.

Anyway, also that a small state like Norway, if we were to connect this to the High North, has every interest in strengthening and sustaining the regime created by multilateral institutions which is the norm of peaceful settlements of conflict. In that sense, it's important that we actually take part in the European Union. And I think that Norway has also everything to gain from strengthening the EU's ability to diffuse crises outside of Europe so that we avoid the effects of these crises spilling over into Europe, as you said as well. So in that sense I would say that Norwegian participation in the ESDP is in both Norway's and Europe's continued interests. Although participating in a way that we do now may not solve all of our security problems at the moment, I would say. Thank you.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Thank you Mr. Norheim. Maybe we'll have time a little bit later to talk about the global crisis which was addressed in the panel before because here the Norwegian expert said that

Norway is quite well off and is not so much affected by the crisis. But I wonder whether the Norwegians are now more or less... are they really thinking about the possibility of membership, you know, Norway tried to join twice and the Norwegians, the majority of the Norwegians, said no, so will there be ever a third try? Just a short answer.

Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen:

Well, as short answer to that, or perhaps a medium answer to that would be that, no, I don't think so, in the very near future, if not something particular were to happen. And the reason for that is that in Norway now we have two rather distinct political blocs with minor members in each bloc really being against membership. In that sense, to secure those blocs, EU membership will not be on the agenda for any time soon. And we also tend to think that there should be at least 25 years between every referendum that we hold. So in that sense we still have about 15 years to go I guess, 10 years to go.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

And another remark, you said about Sweden and Ireland, you called former-neutrals. This was interesting to hear - so you don't think that they are neutral anymore?

Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen:

Maybe a slip of the tongue. Of course they're neutral still. But if you look to Sweden, they're a rather odd neutral compared to Norway, in terms of their defence industry and the transition they have been going through towards a more expeditionary force model.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Well, let's switch over to the two neutral countries which are here on the panel. First, I would like to give Mr. Schwok the floor because maybe he can talk also about the Swiss perspective now of security – are there any threats found in Switzerland now, as you are really, as you see on this map, Switzerland is really a red spot among a sea of blue, of friendly countries more or less surrounding. Maybe some of them are not so friendly, as Mr. Steinbrueck, the German finance Minister, threatened you with a cavalry against your bank secrecy law, but he also threatened us. So Mr. Schwok, you have the floor.

René Schwok:

Thank you very much. I will limit my presentation to three points. First of all, what is specific about Switzerland's security towards European security organisations? What is specific is: Switzerland is the only European country which is not a member of the EU, not a

member of NATO, and not aiming at joining NATO and joining the European Union. This is something we have to stress very much. Even Norway and Turkey are members of NATO, Austria is a member of the EU, and countries from the western Balkans and even Georgia and Ukraine are aiming at joining either NATO and the EU or both. This is not the case in Switzerland and this is something we have to stress. To give you an example, we never had any discussion about joining NATO. We have dozens of referendums all over the year about everything, about building minarets or not building minarets for instance; we have crazy discussions all the time but never anybody raised the issue of joining NATO except maybe one or two scholars.

Another interesting example is EU membership. Yesterday I noticed a very interesting Freudian *lapsus* by the Swiss minister Mr. Delamurra. He said we have dozens of referendums about EU matters but we refused only once something related to the EU. He was referring to the 1992 referendum on joining the European economy carries. But he forgot that there was a popular initiative in 2001 about starting negotiations about joining the EU. And he was against, of course, starting negotiations about joining the EU. So he had this Freudian, as we are in Austria, this Freudian *lapsus*. It tells you that in Switzerland the issue of joining the EU is not on the agenda. I would say something more: the closer we get to the EU through bilateral agreements, and important bilateral agreements like joining Schengen, accepting free movement of persons etc., the closer we get to the European Union, the more difficult it seems to join the European Union. We have this paradox that the closer we are the more difficult and the farthest away seems to be EU membership accession. So this is about the first point, so the specific feature of Switzerland, not aiming at joining NATO and even not aiming anymore at joining the EU.

Second point is: what is the discussion in Switzerland about the security dimension of the European Union? And that discussion is about compatibility between Switzerland's neutrality and EU membership. So maybe you feel younger because that was the discussion you had 20 years ago, I remember very well, Mr Schweitzer wrote a famous report in the name of the Federation of Austrian Industrialists, in order to prove, legally speaking, that there was no contradiction. But this is level of discussion we have. And the main party in Switzerland, the so-called Swiss People's Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei) is claiming and repeating all the time that there is no compatibility between Switzerland's neutrality and EU membership. And the former head of this party is now the new Swiss defence minister, Mr Ueli Maurer, so he is strongly against EU membership, due to so-called neutrality reasons. And so this party, for instance, claims that according to the Lisbon Treaty

there is no compatibility. They quote the close of solidarity, mutual defence closeness in the Lisbon Treaty, in order to argue that there is no compatibility.

This is the argument I discuss in my paper – we are all afraid that you could think we are one of those persons here on the cover. But this is precisely what I discuss in details and also I was also very pleased to see a mention of my last book. It was a discovery half an hour ago, so I would like to thank the organisers for the organisation of the conference and also for mentioning the book.

So I discuss this more into detail: what are the arguments pro and contra? It's very easy to say that there are neutral or non-allied countries in the EU and they are still claiming to be neutral or non-allied. It's very easy to say that all decisions are taken by unanimity within the EU, so every country has a veto power. It's very easy to claim that and nobody has been in any way forced to go into war because it is a member of the EU. But I try several times to convince the Swiss that this is compatibility, but doesn't work. We can try and repeat those arguments, you don't convince the Swiss. More and more Swiss believe in neutrality. 93 percent now don't want to give up neutrality. So in my opinion Swiss government should think in different terms and the Swiss government should start the population to think about a membership with some opting-outs, with some delegations. For internal domestic reasons. And so there is the Malta example, Malta got an exemption clause about neutrality; something Austria didn't get or didn't ask for. But now there is this president of Malta and now also there is the Irish president, due to the refusal of the Lisbon Treaty, so Ireland got another commitment from the EU that Irish neutrality wouldn't be at stake. So Switzerland should think into this direction for purely domestic reasons.

So my third point is about: what is the discussion now in Switzerland about security? This discussion is quite surrealistic. We don't seriously discuss security issues, maybe because we have too friendly neighbours like Austria, but there is no real discussion. There is no real discussion either about what is the purpose of this very expensive Swiss army, except to defend the territory, but against whom? This is never seriously discussed. What is a pity in Switzerland: we don't discuss those soft security dimensions of the EU. And for instance the soft security dimension of EU enlargement. And in my view, EU enlargement was a major soft security instrument in order to stabilize Central and Eastern Europe. But this is never discussed. To give you two examples, we had two referendums in Switzerland about EU enlargement, which is a paradox because we are not members of the European Union and we are the only ones to discuss about EU enlargement. But nevertheless, we had two

referendums, the last one in February of this year, about enlarging to Romania and Bulgaria. But never anybody mentions the fact that by saying yes to Romania and to Bulgaria we stabilise those countries and so we contribute, and the EU mainly is contributing to the stabilisation of those countries.

So, if you give me two more minutes, now the discussion is also surrealistic. We are discussing about sending 30 soldiers to Somalia in order to fight those pirates. This is a proposal by the socialist Foreign Minister, but of course the Conservative Sovereignist Party (SVP) does not agree with this idea. So if you look at the SVP website, you will see, and this is in my - I could show you this in my power point, but I understand it's not the way to organise - but if you look at the website of SVP you will see that they write: this is the end of Switzerland's neutrality, to send 20 soldiers. And so this is the level of discussion we have. Of course, we are going very slowly, so the Swiss federal chambers will discuss these issues only in July, so we have time, and certainly there will be a referendum. I hope there won't be anymore pirates on the day when we send our first troops there, out of Somalia. So this is the surrealistic level of discussion in Switzerland about EU security related matters.

So in conclusion, two words: first of all, I think the Swiss authorities should make the Swiss population more aware of the security dimension, or the soft or smart security decisions of the EU. This is my first proposal. And secondly, the Swiss government should think about EU membership with opting-outs, for instance opting-outs about neutrality. Not because I believe in those, but because I think it's necessary to convince the population that if Switzerland joins it wouldn't jeopardise Switzerland's neutrality.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Well thank you Mr. Schwok. I guess this mission you just addressed is a United Nations mission? The thirty soldiers?

René Schwok:

No, it will be EU mission.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Is it the first mission where the Swiss soldiers will take part in an EU mission?

René Schwok:

No, they already participate in Kosovo and Bosnia, but not in military terms.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Heinz just said: under Austrian command.

René Schwok:

Under Austrian command.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

We even trained Swiss army officials for the operation in Bosnia and Kosovo, if I remember. Our army was very proud because normally it's the other way around, we learn from the Swiss army. So thank you Mr. Schwok for this presentation. And now I give the word to Heinz, you have the floor. I guess you will not only address Austria's neutrality but also talk about the European security threats.

Heinz Gärtner:

Thank you, Otmar. I will come back to neutrality a little later. Somehow it's a privilege to speak last because I can pick up some arguments of my previous speakers already and I will do so. But let me start off with some conceptual considerations. I think there are some students here as well, so they might be interested in some theoretical observations. Security doesn't have only one side, security always has two sides. So I can be secure, either have enough capacities, especially military capacities, to deter any potential aggressor, and that's basically the idea of realists. But there's the other side, so we do have the other side, if there is not a sufficient threat to challenge my security, then I'm secure as well. So either I have lots of capacities or there is a weak threat. So what would be the consequence, the logical consequence, for what options could we have for the European Union or a state. Either, to increase my security or the state security, you can increase capacities, build up military, so that's what the realists would propose. Or you can try to abate, to decrease the threat which challenges my security. So you can build up capacities or try to decrease, to abate the threats. So that's what realists don't really address, but you mention that, Mr. Martinsen, we have multilateral institutions, for example, who can do so, or you can look at the sources of the threats in order to reduce the danger of a threat. So in a more modern version you can say, I can increase my hard power or I can use more soft power. So that's basically the two concepts.

For centuries now, and until the Cold War, we lived in a world of Hobbits, which was the realist world. So increasing capacities was the main thing for the states and that's why we had the arms race in the Cold War. It was characterised by the so-called security dilemma – everybody increased its capabilities and everybody else felt threatened and started to increase capabilities as well. And that was basically also the world of George W. Bush, and you remember, many of you might have heard about this book and expression by Robert Kagan, which was the supporter, theoretical supporter, of George W. Bush: 'Europeans live on Venus and Americans on Mars.' And the Americans live in the real world of Hobbits and I think Robert Kagan lives still in this world and neo-liberalists like this world because there are real labs of the eighteenth and nineteenth century and the Cold War. But the world changed after the end of the Cold War and the threat changed after the end of the Cold War. We don't have the big threats anymore where we have to build up capacity against the Warsaw Treaty organisation armies. We still do have challenges and they are addressed in the European security strategy already, in the one, and we do have a new one now, but already in the 2003 one, and we have proliferation of mass destruction, we have failing, it's called failing states, I don't like this expression, but we do have organised crime, pandemy, we have illicit trafficking of weapons, and mostly the source of all these modern threats are, I would call it not failing, but dysfunctional or weak states. They're the source of terrorism, they're the source of organised crime, not the only one, but they're also the source of uncontrolled migration. So that's basically what the European Union and the world is facing: dysfunctional states which do not have working political and economic system.

And the new European security, I'm going to quote, addresses this idea, it says: "Preventing threats from becoming sources of conflict must be at the heart of our approach". And now the European security strategy proposes a comprehensive, coherent strategy or security approach, including not only military but including diplomatic, economic measures, civil, military crisis management and increasing trade relations and crisis response operations. But the idea is that increasing capacities as such is not sufficient for these new threats. You can have the best army in the world, you can't do much against organised crime or not even terrorism, as we have seen in 9/11.

But there are also consequences of these new threats. We do have massive violations of human rights, even genocide in some cases, as we have seen in Ruanda, ethnic cleansing as we have seen in the Balkans, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Now states do

have the responsibility to protect the citizens. If states don't do that, the international community has to do it. International community, that's the United Nations, other international organisations but also the European Union. And I don't think the European Union is really – is it called “a dwarf”? I do think in this regard the European Union has developed several instruments. Not fully implemented yet, but the idea of the Petersburg tasks, everything of the common European security defence policy, developed already outside the Lisbon Treaty, so they are enshrined in the Lisbon Treaty but they are developed outside the Lisbon Treaty. So we don't really need the Lisbon Treaty to further European security, common security and defence policy. The Petersburg tasks, which address the threats and the extended Petersburg tasks, which include conflict prevention, disarmament operations, humanitarian operations, traditional peace making, and post-conflict stabilisation. And one instrument Mr Martinsen mentioned, that might be the Battlegroups, which is a terrible, terrible expression because they are not only for battles, they are also there to protect people. If there is a disaster area you have to move out people and to fly in food, water, medical supplies.

And all of a sudden we have an interesting twist here. We have an interesting twist in the concept of security. In the world of Hobbits, in the last centuries, the military was there to defend and defeat and destruct enemies and foes and hostile states. All of a sudden we have the idea developing in the European Union turned around, the militaries they are not to vanquish, not to destroy, but to protect people and to protect individuals. That's what we see in Chad, for example the operation. Austria takes part, we have seen it already in Congo and other areas. In the area of the European Union, we also have the solidarity clause. A solidarity clause where member states should assist and aid other member states if they fall victim of a man-made disaster, a natural disaster, including terrorism. I don't think you need to mention terrorism because a man-made disaster is terrorism. By the way, this will be the new language of the Obama administration, so it will rather talk about man-made disaster rather than the war against terrorism. And then, and that we should not confuse, and I will come back to this neutrality, in the Lisbon Treaty now we have also the security commitment clause, which is not a solidarity clause. Not a solidarity clause. The solidarity clause is not even part of the common security and defence policy, it's outside of the European security and defence policy. The security commitment they say every member state has to assist, come to the aid of, another member state with the means in power if this state is attacked or threatened by attack. This is the classical collective defence article. So we do have in the NATO, we had it in the western European Union, instrument of the Cold War, the Amsterdam Treaty ignored it, the Amsterdam Treaty con-

centrated on crisis management and the Petersburg tasks. But now, somehow, I should say off the record, under the Italian presidency, it came into the Lisbon Treaty. And this is not compatible with neutrality. Because if a neutral state promises to come to the aid to another member state with military means, that means giving up neutrality in peace times. Austrian neutrality law prohibits that Austria is part of a military alliance, and collective defence is a military alliance, like still NATO is one, I think we would say former military alliance NATO. But NATO was not happy with that. All the NATO countries went to Brussels and said: no, no, no, no, we already have this in NATO and it might conflict with NATO interests, we have an exception of this clause. Then the neutral and non-alliance states came and said: oh, no, that's not compatible with our neutrality, so we should write in an exception for us as well so it should not affect the characteristics of the individual defence and security policies of the members.

So we are, interestingly enough, we have here a clause where every member state of the European Union has an exception. So why should this clause be in the Treaty? It doesn't make sense. It's not based on a rational threat perception, or threat analysis, like the European security strategy. You cannot derive the commitments of the European security strategy, it's just there. Ok, let me conclude, Otmar already mentioned, I'm not going to, several operations of the European Union which address already this human security concept, protect people and individuals, rather than fight a war. So what I do think, and I will not talk about NATO, because I said former NATO, NATO already moved away from these collective defence core article 5 commitments. NATO is doing crisis management. NATO is doing all kinds of humanitarian operations, like helping out in Katrina and earthquake in Pakistan. NATO is acting out of area and out of continent. It's part of the ISA thing in Afghanistan. So the collective defence part of NATO is not really relevant now for most of the NATO operations as well. And the new NATO operations are also compatible with neutrality. So Austria participates in many of these NATO operations in the framework of Partnership for Peace. Only this collective defence clause, that's why we are not member of NATO. If NATO gave up this clause, Austria easily could be part of NATO. The new member states don't really want that NATO abandon the defence clause.

So in conclusion, my time is up, the new principle of European security is not to vanquish and not destruction, but protection. It's rather threat abatement, you can call it soft security, than increasing excessive capacities – you have to have some capacities, there always has to be some balance, but increasing military capacities is not the correct answer for most of the conflicts, even in Afghanistan. And in this regard I don't agree with you be-

cause Obama said from the beginning Afghanistan cannot be solved by military means alone. We are going to send some 17, 000 troops, but we ask from the allies, from the NATO allies, it's not necessary those, what we need is civilian capacity, financial support, we need training of the Afghan police force and army, we need experts to build up a working legal system, that's what the new American administration expects from the allies. Because also Obama knows that the European Union has to give a large contribution on the civilian side, not only on the military side. On the military side, the Americans are much better anyway. And eventually, one last sentence and it's your turn again, the European Union is more, is much more about making friends in the sense of Kant than creating enemies in the sense of Hobbes.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Thank you, Heinz. Now there is time, I think we start a little bit late, so we have maybe a little bit, five minutes more, so we have around ten minutes for questions. Are there already some questions from the public? Yes, please, the lady in front.

Speaker #1 from audience:

Thank you very much. My question will be perhaps very naïve to the representative of Switzerland. But it reminded me of Jean Ziegler, his book *La Suisse, L'or et les Morts*. I mean, Switzerland doesn't consider certain threats which are evident but they are not discussed perhaps. It occurred to my mind that you have been treating the subject as a subject of compatibility with the concept of neutrality and so forth. But to me, a security threat can also be something ecological. And we are in the same boat in Europe. There are ecological threats, both in Norway and in Switzerland. In Norway one can imagine that there is a spill of oil which destroys the Nordic Sea, I mean, it's considerable to think about it. In Switzerland, as far as I know, there has been a very serious incident contaminating the Rhine from Schaffhausen up to Holland. Now, these are also threats. My question is: do you look at these phenomena as a threat or is it simply something which doesn't enter the concept of threat?

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Thank you. We might collect two more questions, if there are any. If not, Mr. Schwok.

René Schwok:

Do you want me to answer? In a few words. First of all, I'm not a representative of Switzerland, just a scholar. By chance being Swiss, but I'm not a representative of Switzerland. The representative of Switzerland is just here, much more charming.

Now, seriously, I don't see the relationship with my friend Jean Ziegler. Thirdly, of course Swiss authorities and most Swiss are fully aware of what you say, that there are human security threats, including environment, migrations, etc. Of course the Swiss government is fully aware of this. But now the relationship with the EU dimension, because we are supposed to speak today about the EU dimension, Swiss government see this as a necessity to bilateral agreements on environment and to fully participate in all actually European and international institutions dealing with environment. But it doesn't push the Swiss government to ask for EU membership.

Speaker #1 from audience:

So the factor, it is a threat?

René Schwok:

Yes, yes.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Dr Müftüler and then Mr Norheim.

Meltem Müftüler- Baç:

Ok. Just a few points of clarification. After our Norwegian friend I just realised I probably should address that from, the very beginning, when the RAF became operationalised, Turkey has been one of the largest contributors from the non-EU NATO members to all ESDI operations with the exception of Operation Artemis in Congo, and in the Afghanistan mission of NATO Turkey took over the command for four times for a period of six months, the civilian representative of NATO was the former Turkish foreign minister and Turkey was the largest contributor to civilian construction of Afghanistan, in terms of bridges, hospitals, airports and what have you. So in the second dimension as well, if you look at it from the rationalist perspective, in the second dimension of building the civilian aspect of European security, Turkey has contributed much more than most EU members. It was the sixth largest contributor to ESDI, and the way I think Turkey and Norway see eye to eye on a

number of issues has actually made us put together a project. I put the brochures outside. We are doing a project joined with the University of Oslo's ARENA on democracy and security in Europe. I have the brochures if you want further information on that, I'll hand them out.

Otmar Lahodynky:

Thank you. Mr Norheim.

Per Martin Norheim-Martinsen:

Well, I think you're quite right when it comes to ecological challenges and the way that climate change also really changes quite a lot for Norway. Obviously, I mean, if the Gulf Stream was diverted we would turn into Alaska, which would be disastrous for us anyway. But I mean, the retraction of the polar ice for example, that opens up to a new shipping route that will go past Norwegian waters. That gives us a control challenge, really. It might affect fisheries, which is also one of our, really, main interests. If fisheries are exploited elsewhere in European waters, we might have a challenge of defending our economics and more fiercely than we have done so far. And really, as I said earlier, the reason why it's not certain that we will start exploiting oil in the High North is basically because there is quite some political resistance towards doing that. In that sense, I think the European Union might very soon start putting pressure on Norway to start exploiting these resources, basically saying, these are resources that should fall onto everyone, not just Norway, for economic interest. So in that sense, I think climate change and ecological challenges is something that Norway takes serious, if you read the Northern Strategy. Still, I don't think that we see the full range from it, yet. Thank you for the question, I think it's important.

Otmar Lahodynky:

Any more questions from the public?

Meltem Müftüler- Baç:

Can we ask a question?

Otmar Lahodynky:

Of course.

Meltem Müftüler- Baç:

I think Switzerland is now being exposed to a new security threat, but from the Americans and the EU members as well I think there is now an economical warfare going on on Switzerland, and that's also something that we don't consider as a security challenge, but it is.

René Schwok:

I agree. I took the narrow definition of security in my presentation because I had five minutes. But if you use the concept of human security we can put everything in this overstretched concept of human security; you can put economy, you can put ecology, you can put migration, you can put everything. So, true, I took the narrow definition.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

And there's a threat where the famous Swiss army is more or less powerless, can't do anything against Finance Minister of Germany and President of the United States.

Heinz Gärtner:

You cannot put the Swiss army in the concept of human security; you cannot put it in everything.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Well, I hope it was an interesting debate. For me it was, I hope for the panellists and for the audience as well. We have now lunch break and I want to remind and invite you all, so please don't go away, don't go away to some other distractions, but at 2:15pm there is the panel, the last panel for today and for the seminar. It is the panel about the future of the EU, *The EU in 2020*, which will be very interesting to see how the European Union might develop in the future. And, again, we will have panellists from the three extra-European countries and Austria. So I hope to see you all there. Ah! There's a last question, please.

Speaker #2 from audience:

At the beginning you mentioned that it's pure factional pressure about the information of the European army, is it really in the agenda right now?

Otmar Lahodynsky:

Yes, it's still in progress. As I mentioned, there are several battle groups. Mr Norheim mentioned, last year the first battle group was formed, there are at least, I think, ten others to follow in the next years. And then we have at the same time this Rapid Reaction Force

building up, which will be, Heinz you know it better than me, the Rapid Reaction Force comprising about 30,000 soldiers.... 60,000, sorry.

Heinz Gärtner:

15,000; 24 it's for NATO, 15 for European Union.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

15,000, let's correct it. In all, it's 30,000?

Heinz Gärtner:

No, no, in all it's 15,000, more or less so, but each one should consist of up to 1000.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

But these are of course soldiers all from NATO countries in the Rapid Reaction Force.

Heinz Gärtner:

No, no. Sorry, I talk too long. For clarification: there is no European army as such in the offing. European army would mean a single European command structure. It's not going to happen. In the Lisbon Treaty you have, already in the preamble you can read: a security and defence policy is up to the single member states. But you have coordinated operations going on and you have battle groups consisting of several European states, for example, which is not large, the battle groups are, as I said, 15,000 and each one should consist of up to 1500, not necessarily, and not confusing with a NATO Rapid Reaction Force, which should be 24,000, but NATO now is reducing.

Meltem Müftüleri- Baç:

But battle groups are also not only for EU members.

Heinz Gärtner:

Norway is the exception, but let me say, there is also the headline goal in the European Union, which is the idea that you create some force pool of up to 60,000. That's different to the battle group. But now the European Union, they are pretty silent about it, so that's not going to happen very soon. That line was delayed several times now. Now they're focusing on the much smaller battle groups which are for much smaller operations, which is not the European army. So in that sense, the realists are correct saying that security defence mat-

ters are up to the nation states. That's the last thing the nation states would give up, the decision about life and death. Giving up this decision to Brussels is a very hard thing to do, because the national politicians would be responsible for that. And also, NATO is not a European army, NATO is a multilateral organisation and NATO council decides with consensus, so we have to keep these things separate.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

We didn't mention that Mr Sarkozy said that now France returns to the NATO military command, which is a kind of sign of strengthening NATO. Many people said already, many experts said, NATO might more or less be useless, under the Bush administration NATO had a big crisis. So now under Obama, we will see it in only two weeks time what he will have to say in Europe, in Strasbourg and in Prague. Also we didn't discuss about this missile shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, we'll see what he will have to say about that. There are signs that apparently this project might be scrapped, but it's not sure yet.

Well, thanks again for listening and see you all at 2:15.

Meltem Müftüleri- Bağ:

And he will be in Istanbul on the sixth, so from Prague he is moving to Istanbul.

Otmar Lahodynsky:

From Prague even to Istanbul, so another appointment for Obama. Great, thanks.