

PANEL F – THE EU IN 2020

Chair: Brigitte Fuchs, Ö1

Panellists: Peter Burgess, PRIO (NO); Atilla Eralp, METU (TR); Eva Nowotny, Botschafterin (AT); Laurent Goetschel, Uni Basel (CH).

Brigitte Fuchs:

What we are trying to deal with is the future of the European Union. Our task is to discuss the EU by the year 2020. Now, that might be a very very easy task, because we don't have deal with facts really, nobody can prove us wrong if we get it wrong. And I thought because it's an afternoon session I would maybe start off by a provocative thought, and I say, I believe the EU as we know it today will not exist by the year 2020. But then I thought, maybe this is not such a good idea. What will I do if my fellow panel members here just agree with me, then there is absolutely nothing provocative about it. So I would reduce myself to say that the EU will not exist in the way it is today in the year 2020, which is a very safe thing to say because the European Union is a rather dynamic thing, so it changes all the time, from day to day. It's like a piece of art in progress and hopefully not a museum in progress.

Let me introduce my panel to you. Immediately to my, no, to my far left from my view, from your view it's different, is Peter Burgess from Norway. When I read his CV I thought he's a very typical, or a very, not typical actually, but a very interesting European. He comes from Norway, which is not a member of the European Union. He was born in Germany. He works at the University, or two universities actually in Norway; for one University in Poland in Warsaw. He studied in Germany in France and in Italy. So that would make him like a perfect European, traveller. And he is a research professor at the International Peace Research Institute in Oslo.

My panellist to my left is Atila Eralp, who is a professor in the School of International Relations, he studied at the School of International Relations, luckily, in southern California, and he now is a Jean Monnet for politics and European integration at the Middle Eastern University of Ankara.

To my right is Eva Novotny, she is the Austrian member on the panel. She is a diplomat, Foreign Service, a Korea diplomat. She used to be the foreign policy advisor in the Austrian chancellery. Then she was ambassador to a number of countries, the latest one

was she was Austrian ambassador to Washington, before that she was Director General in the Foreign Office for European integration.

And to my far right, not politically, just on the panel, far left from the audience's view, is Laurent Goetschel who we have, some of us had the pleasure to hear already in this seminar. He is from the University of Basel and like the colleague from Norway he also is professor for Peace Initiatives, is that correct?

Laurent Goetschel:

Yes.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Ok. As I said before, our task is to have a view of the EU in the year 2020 and I would like to start off with our colleague from Ankara, you have the floor.

Atilla Eralp:

Thank you for your introduction. I would start immediately challenging you and say that in the international system we need more of the European Union, not less of the European Union. Especially in the turbulent international system the EU needs to be more attractive and we need more active involvement of the EU in issues of global governance. But I would like to start thanking the organisers for the excellent conception of EXTRA Europe and bringing Turkey into the discussion because Turkey is usually treated alone in an isolated way but it's extremely important to bring Turkey into this debate. As a social scientist I find difficult to predict the future. We also in social science have difficulty in making forecasts and predicting the future but, as you rightly pointed out, especially in the context of crisis which we are living in, we need to talk about the future of Europe, the future of the international system so we need to make some speculations. I think in the context of crisis we can talk about, crudely speaking, about two possible scenarios. I will mention that it's very difficult for me to go into the detail. One possible scenario is the more historical pattern which is rise of protectionism, increasing competition and rivalries in the international system and you know, the possibility of in that context Europe become fortress Europe, more inward looking and more protectionist, and closing its borders and defining its identity in terms of more geographical and religious value. So that's one possibility which is the normal historical pattern

The second pattern is to have more multilateralism, more cooperation in the international system, more global types of governance and the possibility of creating light house Europe, in which Europe becomes more attractive, more inclusive, and defines European identity more in terms of political and economic values rather than religious and geographical values. I hope the first scenario will not be implemented because when we look at history the first scenario has created disastrous outcomes, it has resulted in the great depression, the Second World War, rising nationalism. And after the war in the international system and also in Europe, people have derived important lessons and I hope those lessons will be internalised by all of us and we will not repeat the same historical mistakes.

When I look at the second scenario, the second scenario, a more open system, more multilateralism, that scenario faces important difficulties in the short term. But in my opinion it is the only scenario which could work in the medium term and in the long term, especially in a globalised kind of a system where all actors are linked to each other and all issues are linked to each other. When I look at the global developments, and we are living in a period of economic crisis, but at least there is a new administration in the United States and that brings a certain optimism in terms of having more multilateralism having more transatlantic type of cooperation and as we witnessed the United States was unilateralist for a long time, and that unilateral attitude of the United States has created important tensions in the international systems. So there are some hopes, let's say as a result of the American administration.

When we look at the European level, at the European level there are difficulties. In addition to the economic crisis there is a prolonged institutional crisis. And that institutional crisis has slowed down the process of European integration and in that crisis as we witnessed, the European Union starts to lose its attractiveness in the international system. It has lost its transformative power which was extremely important in the context of European periphery especially. And also the European Union is increasingly losing its capacity in the global arena; it is losing its role as a global actor. Therefore, in my opinion, there is necessity of the ratification of Lisbon reform Treaty. This is urgent and Europe has lost a lot of time in terms of this institutional problem. Now it seems that there is a possibility for the Irish to ratify the Lisbon reform Treaty. The crisis, the economic crisis affecting Ireland in such a way that the Irish are finally realising that they need to ratify the

Treaty. And if that happens, if the Lisbon Treaty is rectified, this could solve to a certain degree the prolonged institutional problems of the European Union.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Still the Czech president has to sign it as well.

Atilla Eralp:

Yes, you know, but I think it will not be, or I hope at least, that the Czechs have that role in the European Union as presidents so they will sign it. But if the Lisbon Treaty is rectified then it could open up possibilities for enlargement, again. And I think that enlargement is one of the most successful policies of the European Union. And although there are all kinds of criticisms of the enlargement process it has become a scapegoat really, unfortunately, in the context of both economic crisis and institutional crisis in Europe. And I think again that the process of enlargement in Europe will remain incomplete without the inclusion of the Balkans and Turkey. The inclusion of both Balkans and Turkey together really, is extremely important, not only from the perspective of the region but from the perspective of the European integration as well, and Balkans and Turkey should be thought together. There are some tendencies to include Balkans but to exclude Turkey. This would be, this could create all kinds of negative ramifications, especially when we think of historical patterns, this would result in the othering of Turkey which would be extremely dangerous in terms of the Balkan regions and in terms of the European context. And in addition to the inclusion of Balkans and Turkey, in the eastern Mediterranean we also have an incomplete or problematic process of enlargement. Cyprus is included but it is a divided island and definitely Cyprus has to be integrated and this year and next year is extremely important in Cyprus and in the context of eastern Mediterranean. On both issues, both on the Balkans and on Cyprus, Turkey has a crucial role to play. It will be extremely difficult without the inclusion of Turkey and also Turkey has an important role to play in the Balkans. Now in addition to this issue of enlargement, also the European Union has to be more active in her neighbourhood. Neighbourhood issue is extremely important from the European point of view. And the neighbourhood policy has to be revitalised. There are all kinds of problems with the neighbourhood policy. Definitely the EU has to introduce more incentives to increase regional ownership to the neighbourhood policy. The actors in the regions themselves do not want the neighbourhood policy and this is quite unfortunate. And also the neighbourhood policy has to be expanded. The EU has to be more actively involved, in Iraq, in Iran, in the Arab-Israeli conflict, in the Middle East issues in

general. These issues should not be left to the United States alone. The EU has to have more responsibility in terms of these issues. I will not go into the role of Turkey in these matters. My colleague maltam in the previous session looked at Turkey's role in the Middle East, in her neighbourhood, etc. and Turkey has a crucial role to play in terms of creating mechanism of dialogue with the European Union and including the regional and neighbouring countries. Now, in addition to the European Union's role in the process of enlargement and also neighbourhood, the EU has to be more active on global issues as well. And some of them are discussed, but let me mention the issue of energy security, the issue of climate change, the issue of the weapons of mass destruction and especially when it comes to issue of poverty, the EU has to be more active on those issue. Now finally, let me come to my conclusion saying that at this point the EU seems to have two options really. Either it could aim to maintain its privileges, in a sphere of welfare and democracy etc. in its own sphere and aim to become a fortress kind of Europe. Or take more responsibility in regional and global issues and aim to become a global actor. These are the two possible options in front of you, Europe. And in my opinion, and I hope, since I can speculate on this, the EU will work on the second option and become more of a global actor. This is not important, not only for the European Union but for the turbulent international system. And that's the way I started my presentation. I think we need more of the European Union in wider European and also in the interlineal system.

Now when we look at the international system we are increasingly witnessing a multi-polar system. The twenty-first century will be a multi-polar system, quiet different from the twentieth century and from previous centuries. And it will be less western dominated, the rise of china, India and other actors. So we will have a different type of a multi-polar system. In a multi-polar system that would two possibilities: either you have unilateral approaches – and this would be quite dangerous really – where you have unilateral approaches, or you'll have more multilateral kind of approaches. And for a viable multi-polar system you need to have mechanism of a multilateralism. So I am trying to, in speculating for the future, we need more multi-polar multilateralism in the international system. And we need in that sense more of European Union because the European Union in comparisons to all the other actors has more experience in multilateralism. And this experience of the European Union could be quite important in solving the global problems and as the European Union focuses on global problems it could more of a source of attraction in the international system again. And let me also finally conclude my making a comment on Turkey. I think a transformed Turkey, a more democratic Turkey, which stays

in the accession process, would help the EU to become a more attractive pole, a more multicultural pole in the turbulent international system.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Thank you professor Eralp. I quite liked the expression you used “lighthouse” Europe, as a shining light for the rest of the world. At the same time you were talking about a privileged zone of the world, the privilege of democracy, which is an interesting thought, I think, that democracy is a privilege rather than an achievement by a nation or a multinational community. I believe from what we’ve talked about over the last few days, professor Goetschel, you had thoughts going in this direction as well.

Laurent Goetschel:

Well, more or less. I’d like also to adopt basically a positive starting assumption, saying that I think it would be necessary for the EU to still exist in 2020 maybe even in 2030 because 2020 is already pretty soon and it would hardly have time to disintegrate by then probably but so also if we think a little bit further ahead. I also think it should play a role, a constructive role, as the first speaker has said. But I think this has some conditionalities so it will not just happen like this. And I’d like to point at two or three briefly.

The first of these conditionalities has to do with political legitimacy. I think the issue of political legitimacy is by far the most important the most crucial one today. If I may say so to provoke a little bit, far more important than the issue of enlargement, including the wonderful Turkey. Because it’s a basic issue also for the EU as it exists today, without Turkey without Switzerland without Norway without whoever we might think about as a further partner. And we have, without entering now into a lecture on political science, when we talk about legitimacy, political scientist have two types of approaching this issue of legitimacy, one is output legitimacy and the other one is input. Output legitimacy is about the quality of what is being done. Saying in a nutshell the EU is legitimate, is being seen as positive by European and by Europeans because it’s producing a good policy, because it’s offering solutions for issues that might not find a solution otherwise. Like for example mutual recognition of diplomas or opening the borders etc. etc. and until today the EU has always been a rather good in this field. And people who are in favour of the European Union, Europeanists, have always tended to base their arguments on this type of legitimacy. Like it has already been mentioned several times during this conference now, Europe is a peace project. Europe has achieved peace on the European continent,

especially the politicians who opened this seminar like to stress this type of argument. So this is typically an output legitimacy argument. But I think this was very important at the beginning and probably it was very important until today but I think the legitimacy of the European Union in 2020 or 2030 will not be based only on this type of legitimacy. It will need to be based much more also on what we call input legitimacy and this is about the type of process which precedes decisions being taken within the European Union. How do we come to the outputs we actually have? And this is on one side linked to the European parliament, democracy issues, the possibilities for more people to participate in these kind of decisions. But it is and I would say this is even more important, linked to the kind of presentation of processes the member states themselves make of what is being produced, of what is being decided or what is maybe not being decided within the European Union. So I'm talking about processes and democracy regarding European decision making within the member states. Today very often it's the opposite. Whatever is positive on the European level this is the result of national politics and whatever is negative this is the result of European politics. And I think if we continue on this path it will be a catastrophe for the legitimacy of the European Union. And then we had the problems with the Lisbon Treaty, but not only with the Lisbon Treaty, especially with the constitutional Treaty project. This was largely an issue of input legitimacy, of lack of input legitimacy. And there are several scenarios in this field, I mean, the Danes were very progressive in this part, they had a parliamentary commission which were very extensive regarding their powers. But one could also think about more referendums within more member states on European issues, like the Irish are doing, trying, they're having problems, but if more states would have more referendums, probably more states would have problems. And this could be more difficult but maybe also more sustainable for European integration to move on. So this is one issue of political legitimacy.

Second issue, I call it differentiated integration. What do I mean with differentiated integration? I do not mean that more states should become associated with the European Union. I think all states who participate in it should be members. There shouldn't be different categories on this level. But I expect, and maybe I should have started with this, regarding this point, I expect the European Union to enlarge. I expect the European Union, I'm not sure if by 2020 but by 2030 I expect it to count 36 member states, 36 meaning all the Balkan states, meaning Turkey, meaning Iceland, meaning Norway, meaning even Switzerland. I think such a European Union will not be able to function with all the member states having the same obligations and doing the same things. And I'm not only thinking

about it in a transitional phase saying well, you know, you negotiate when a new member state gets into the European Union it has so much years to adapt in this field or the other field. I think one should get used to the fact that not all member state may be willing or not all member states may be actually capable to do the same thing in all respective policy fields of the European Union. And maybe, and that's even more important, following the title of this panel, it may not be advisable for the European Union as a whole if all the member states have to do the same things in all the different policy fields and so we may be thinking of some kind of partial types of integration but still integration not association, where certain member states do not take part in certain fields of European integration. Without any time limits .and this should be sorted when the respective member states join the European Union. And I know that certain studies have been made regarding Turkey, by political scientists who try to accommodate a special case, and I think in this regard Turkey is a very interesting example because it motivates our creative way of thinking but I think what comes out of this type of reflection is not only important for Turkey, it's also important for potential other new member states. So Turkey has an interesting case study.

And third point, and I will be shorter on that one, it was already mentioned by the first speaker, I thinking 2030 if the European Union is still, it should be also more present on the international scene. And I do not think that the European Union necessarily should aspire to be a second type of United States. I think the European Union should pursue the way it has started to develop in the international arena, especially also stressing civilian types of international crisis management, especially the Germans, for their own national reasons, linked to the past and to the future have stressed the civilian type of intentional crisis management of the European Union. I do think that the European Union should develop further skills and capacities regarding international mediation, international facilitation, I do think that the European Union has a special role to play there, and if it manages to develop this role, this would also contribute indirectly to strengthen the legitimacy of the European integration towards the European citizens.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Thank you professor Goetschel. Norway is a member of the European Union, maybe not by 2020 but by 2030. Do you see that?

Peter Burgess:

That was very optimistic of my colleague. I will come to that maybe at the end. I want to use my very precious seven minutes, exactly seven minutes, on three points. I was actually quite inspired by both of the previous speakers, especially in the sense that they provided kind of a programme for how we would get from A to B, from here to future, 2020, 2030. And I, as a philosopher, you didn't mention this, I'm not a political scientist, I'm a philosopher, so I wanted to really reflect on the thought of Europe, as philosophers like to do. What it will mean to think Europe in 2020. So three very, at the surface at least, very straightforward points and then maybe that can be cracked open a bit in the discussion if we wish. The first is how Europe, the European and the EU understand itself. Second, is how it understands others, what it's not. And then thirdly, what this means for this wonderful concept I also agree of the EXTRA Europe. So I want to congratulate whoever came up with this concept, I think it's very very rich and I'm going to tell you why I think that too, as well. First of all, the EU's relationship to itself, Europe's relationship to itself, and I made the mistake just now, confusing EU and Europe, they're not the same. And this ambiguity is of course in the symposiums title all together. That ambiguity has not only been always the case, it's always been since the birth of the European communities and the European Union, there's always been an ambivalence between Europe and the EU. But even well before that we can talk about ambivalence in Europe's understanding of itself. Ever since the first myth of Europe was presented in Greek literature there's been this confusing about what Europe can be. Europe, conceptually speaking now, not institutionally speaking, doesn't really know what it is. And we're talking about a possible crisis in terms of identity, there's been an identity crisis the while time. And that's not just a bad thing, that's also a very productive thing. And there's been a whole, I can just take some illustrations of this ambivalence or confusion, is Europe a history of a certain kind of values, is it a consolidation of a certain number of rights, is it a geography, is it a set of political institutions, is it language, is it religion, is it culture – you know the story. For this audience I don't need to repeat it. But the point is: none of this is adequately concentrated into any of the institutions of the European Union. So when the European Union looks at itself and tries to formulate legitimate policies, it's always at odds with its own legitimacy.

Second point: the relationship of Europe to its others. Again here, what is the other Europe, what is the threat? What is the enemy, what is the other culture, what is the other language, what is the other religion, what is Europe opposed to? Clearly it's not just across the border to the European Union, the European member states that they have this

problem. I was glad; I missed the panel where Europe was presented as a project of peace. This is very important because, not because it was that because it's no longer that. Right? In 1951 the Treaty of Paris, 1957 the Treaty of Rome, when the European steel and coal community was formed, of course this was a project of peace. There was a threat to Europe. What was the threat? Europe. Europe was a danger to itself and knew it and took action. And it worked, more or less. So the *other* of Europe, the threat to Europe was Europe. Or we could say more particularly, the past, Europe's past. And it remains in some degree. What's it become now? That entire situation has evolved and there has been something of an externalisation of the threat to Europe, the otherness of the *other* of Europe, and now it's something more like, to talk very loosely and in the seven minute framework, migration. It's the North Africans paddling across Gibraltar that are threatening us. It's no longer the nightmare of another war between France and Germany and others. So we have this distinct evolution of what the *other* of Europe is, from an internal *other* to an external *other*. And then it gets more complicated because as we know the nasty terrorists that threaten us in all the ideological version of the war against terror are also Europeans. So even though we want to externalise the terrorist as a threat to Europe to the United States, to western civilisation, of course we all know that they are born and educated and often citizens of Europe. Not always, but often, empirically speaking. So the threat to Europe is complex indeed. The *other* of Europe is complex indeed. So internally and externally there is a very complex, and increasingly complex, situation. And my point here in bringing this up is that there is no reason to believe that it won't continue to become more complex.

So thirdly, what about the EXTRA Europe? There is something really wonderful about this title because as you know, or at least you who feel comfortable in English, know that there's a double meaning in EXTRA Europe. You can talk about extra in the sense of extraordinary, it's more than Europe, it's beyond Europe, it's Europe plus something. And I think that's probably the intention, I'm not quite sure in the German how it was conceived in a German mind for English language. But there's also another meaning of this, it's the one of Europe as a supplement. It's Europe, again, but a little more, a little bit extra Europe, like extra peanut butter when you buy the big jar in the United States. It's extra, it's a little bit more of the same. So what does it mean to be a little bit more the same, what does it mean to expand, to enlarge Europe, do you get more of something else or do you get more of the same?

And I'm reminded of this lovely Peter Handke novel, to talk about an Austrian, *Die Innenwelt the Aussenwelt der Innenwelt*, the inner world of the outer world of the inner world, the typical Handke title, where he's talking about his experience of his experience of experience of his feelings, and it goes on and on. Anyway, that's another matter. That's what we're dealing with again. What is it to be inside Europe as outside Europe as inside Europe. Where does Europe stop and where does it begin. I'm not talking about the European Union borders, I'm talking about the idea of Europe, I'm talking about the fact that Norway, Turkey, Switzerland already are kind of Europe. Europe but not really Europe, and that's what's meant by the organisers of this symposium in calling it EXTRA Europe.

Let's look at Norway, the case I know very well, very briefly. Norway is probably in bureaucratic, administrative terms, more European than any other European country. I know of no other state that is better at following every regulative of the European Union without even being obligated to. So we're excellent the Norwegians, you go to Brussels, you can visit the Norwegian delegation, it's bigger than the Swiss one, sorry, bigger than one of the member states ones. It's huge, it's just a big animal and they're all doing their very best to be so European, and I think the strategy is that when the tie comes, when the vote comes, and all the Norwegian people say yes finally, then we're ready, we're ready to go. But it's really a fantasy of the political elite in Norway, thinking that someday it's going to happen. It's not going to happen.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Never ever?

Peter Burgess:

No, and that's for the other reason. It's already too late. This is the backfiring of good diplomats and bureaucrats. We've already become so European that there's no point. We're already European. And I suspect the same can be said for Switzerland. A little bit different case in Turkey. So to conclude here these comments, what is it going to look like to be extra European, what is extra Europe in 2020? Today it's maybe Norway, Turkey, Switzerland. In 2020 there'll be many extra-Europes, many constellations of quasi European inseparable from Europe, where Europe couldn't be Europe without them and they couldn't be what they are without Europe. I'm thinking in economic terms, China and India – these will be European. And in energy terms, Russia, Algeria, Norway still of

course, at least for another 50 years. In migration terms, the migration Europe, Morocco, Libya, Ukraine, these will all carry their own trace of Europe and Europe, with every single day, will be reminded of how involved they are in Europe. So Norway, Switzerland and Turkey –they're already Europe. And I think with great confidence that Norway will never vote to become European for this reason. I think that we cannot say that for Turkey but I'll bet that it's the same case for Switzerland. That this constellation is already so crystallised in the identity of what Europe is, in the bureaucracy of what European is, that an actual integration, in the strict sense of the word, building it into the identical institutions, is not going to happen.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Thank you. Last but not least, Eva. Where do you see the European Union by 2020?

Eva Nowotny:

Well, first of all I would like to say that I have already heaps of comments that I've accumulated during the three presentations. But nevertheless I see the need to make my own few points. I think my role is now, after we have heard three looks from outside into the European Union, to present a little bit the look from inside the European Union, out to the outside world. As I started to think about this whole notion of what is the European Union going to look like in 2020, first of all I was reminded of a quotation by a very famous Austrian writer, cultural philosopher, Karl Krauss, who once said, prophecy is very difficult, especially about the future. So I said, well, let's look the other way. Let's look at the European Union in 1990, 1980, was it fundamentally different from the European Union that we know now. I mean, 2020 is ten years from now. If we look ten years back... and I would say that it was not fundamentally different. We have added more members, we have changed a few of the procedures, there are new issues that have come up and that need to be discussed,

Brigitte Fuchs:

And we have a common currency.

Eva Nowotny:

We have a common currency, yes. But basically in the way the Union functions, it was not fundamentally different. And the reason is that the Union does not evolve in big leaps

forwards, in revolutionary steps. It evolves steadily, in a slow grinding process, which is sometimes very painful, difficult, sometimes totally frustrating. But that's the way it works. So there is a constant slow development. But then, on this basis, you could assume that most probably the European Union in the year 2020 will have changes in membership, will have a few new procedures but it will be, basically, not much different from the European Union that we know in 2009 or 2010. But, and that is the other side of the coin, the world of 2020 is going to be very different from the world today. And here, with permission, I would like to take issue with something that Atila has said, because he spoke that we are moving into a world with a multi-polar system. We have moved out of a world with a multi-polar system and we are moving into a much more difficult situation, which is a non-polar world. We have gone from bi-polar, over multi-polar over uni-polar, but now we are going into a non-polar system, and that is going to make huge demands on each and every one to keep some kind of stability in a kind of a global governance that is becoming increasingly fragile and increasingly risky. The United States are beset with enormous difficulties, politically as well as financially. The European Union, perhaps not yet ready to assume this role, and no other country ready to take that role. So who is going to be really the guardian of a kind of a world order, a global system of governance in which, sort of, also the small states can develop into their business. And this is the big question: is the European Union going to be able to fulfil that role? Now if we look at the international developments of the European Union we have the four, sort of the four parameters that are really interesting. The one is the monetary Union and the internal market, the second one is the institutional development, the third one is enlargement, enlargement of the Union, and I would add as a fourth one, the whole issue of internal security, which ties a little bit, and we should come back to that notion, in the discussion and to what Atila said to the danger of fortress Europe and the new threat perceptions with which we have to deal.

Now especially during the last weeks, and the last months really, the crisis of the global financial system and the global economic system that we are facing gave rise to a number of nationalistic protectionist notions in the discussion and it really came to the point where some spectators commented, analysts prophesied already that this is going to be the end of the common currency, it's going to be the breaking point of the European Union such as it is. And I think especially looking back on the development of the last two days and the results of the summit meeting in Brussels now, that we have overcome that point. And that rational thinking, stepping back from protectionist nationalistic notions, seeing the common

good and the whole of all the responsibilities that are incumbent has won the day. And that makes me hopeful, that also for the future and for the crises that are still there, we will be able to deal with it. I think this was the realisation on the very high political level that they were on a dangerous path and that they really got their act together and assembled behind a common notion and common prophecies, common hypothesis.

If you look at the international developments of the European Union, we need, and I'm very convinced of that, we need the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. This is essential if the European Union wants to maintain some kind of external role, international role on the one side, as well as for the internal issues of political legitimacy, democratic government transparency. Without the Treaty of Lisbon this is going to be very difficult because the procedures on which we are working at the moment are so opaque that it's going to be very difficult to fulfil that expectation of a large and interested public audience. If we get the Treaty of Lisbon, then I think the European Union will be much better equipped to take that international role and assume some kind of political leadership also in a , as I said at the beginning, an increasingly difficult international system. I am hopeful that we are getting it, because also looking back at the history of the European Union, there was always a correlation between enlargement on the one side and deepening of integration on the other. And almost all the enlargements of the European Union can be correlated to a further deepening of European integration, whether it was the single European act, or the Treaty of Maastricht or the Treaty of Amsterdam, when the Nordic countries and Austria joined. And so with the last massive enlargement that we had the institutional reform has come and is extremely important. The signs now also with what we hear from Ireland point in that direction that a second referendum in Ireland might bring a different result and that we will get that institutional setup which is necessary.

Remains the issue of enlargement, and here we are, as you all know, we are already in negotiations with Turkey and with Croatia. The negotiations with Turkey are going slowly, are very, very difficult, and perhaps one should add as a footnote here that it's a kind of a euphemism if talk about enlargement negotiations because they are not really negotiations. I mean the enlargement is about the acceptance of the *acquis communautaire* and the implementation of the, *acquis communautaire*, sort of the holy bible of the European Union in an exceeding country. And what you negotiate is sort of phases of implementation, deadlines, transition periods and so on. But the substance of

the legal base of the European Union is non-negotiable and thus it is a little bit sort of a euphemism if we talk about negotiation.

I agree with what has been said before that perhaps not by 2020 but at least in the surrounding years and enlargement, further enlargement of the Union will have become inevitable. And there is more or less already a consensus developing that the countries of south east Europe, the so-called western Balkans, are candidates for future membership. Not all of them at the same time but in line with their own internal developments. But this is an enlargement of the European Union that will come. The question of Turkey is of course a much more difficult one as is the question of Ukraine as is the questions of the countries that are interested in joining in the Caucasian region, Georgia and others, where these notions are developing. And that brings us really to the very basic question, which has never been properly discussed in Europe, or which has been, sort of, where people have skirted around, and that's a question: is there a frontier, is there a border, to what a European Union can be and may be one of these days. And we have already touched on this issue; there are many different definitions of Europe. You have the Europe of the European Union, you have the Europe of the council of Europe, you have the Europe of the organisation of security and cooperation in Europe, which reaches already very far into central Asia, you have the Europe of the Eurovision Song Contest and the Soccer Europe – they all have different memberships and different compositions and that's very interesting to look at because the question, the basic question, is there a definition, is there an end to what Europe is and can be has never really been answered. When I went to school we learned that the Ural Mountains is the end of Europe. Now that doesn't bring us very far because that's sort of in the middle of Russia and it's politically an untenable definition. And so we have always worked our way around these issue and we have talked about criteria and democratic government and parliamentary system and market economy and so forth, but we have never really answered that question. And I have the feeling that the debate about it is getting more urgent and that people, the general public, is no longer content with these evasions and that sooner or later we will have to come up with a politically defined and argued position about what we are going to do and it where there is a, if there is and where there is a border to what a European Union can be and will be.

So to sum up: I don't think the European Union of the year 2020 will be fundamentally different from the European Union that we know today. It will be different in aspects, it will be different in its institutional setup, it will be different in membership and I hope, and this

is my own personal statement and wish at the end, I hope that it will be better–equipped to play an international role in an increasingly dangerous and fragile global system.

Brigitte Fuchs:

You just mentioned, and that I think has been mentioned for the first time in the last two days, the words general public. This is something I personally felt lacking in this symposium because we had very interesting talks on European culture, European identity, on art on the economy on enlargement, deeper integration, but we did not talk very much about the people of Europe of the general public, as you called it. And not only in Ireland but also in other countries, maybe that changed a little bit due to the economic crisis, but before the crisis started, the people of Europe, European citizens, or subjects, for the ones coming from monarchies, were getting less and less convinced by the concept of Europe, and for very different reasons. Some of them didn't believe in enlargement, others didn't believe in deeper integration. We all here, I believe, think it would be a very good idea of having the European not constitution by the Treaty of Lisbon agreed upon by the Irish, but I do fear that this is not going to be enough to convince the people of Europe that more integration more enlargement, more European super state, where the European super state always of course says there is no European super state, but they would say, wouldn't they, is such a good idea. How do we come about to convince the general public, not only that this is the only way we can go, that this is the best way we can go.

Eva Nowotny:

I think you have made a very interesting point and it was professor Goetschel who introduced the principle of political legitimacy which is an extremely important one. But I think one has to look also at this issue from different aspects. Austria is a country that has become increasingly critical about some of the procedures, not about its membership in the European Union, but about some of the things that are happening there. Today, we have published the latest opinion poll where 60 percent feel that the European Union should have more power and should be stronger and better equipped to deal with all the diffused pending issues that are in the air in times or crisis. The second aspect, which I find most interesting is that it's usually when you get these opinion polls and when you have the public discussion about these questions, it's people like us who discuss. But the interesting thing is the generation E. and the generation E is sitting here. These are the young people who have grown up in a European Union without internal borders, with their European passports, with all the scholarship opportunities, with the jobs, the voting rights

and everything. And I think it's going to be the interesting question really how they see and feel about the European Union because we all have come from somewhere different. We have lived in a different political system and have then grown into the European Union for whatever reason. But they were born into it, and that I find very interesting, how this generation is going to bring about a shift in the perception.

Atila Eralp:

Can I ask a question to Eva, I mean: is the general public really interested in formulating the frontiers of Europe or is this really a discussion among the elites of Europe? I think it's more a discussion among the elites rather than the general public. The general public is interested in more welfare, more jobs, more concrete issues. Your presentation implied, I don't know whether I'm correct, that the general public likes the definition of the, geographically speaking, the definition of Europe. Is that really the case?

Eva Nowotny:

Well, probably they are not arguing about a definition of the frontiers of Europe. But they are posing the question: is this going on? Is this going on and on and on ad infinitum? Are we adding one country after the other or will there be a natural end to the whole process? And this is something that at least in our country is discussed. And that's discussed not only among the elite, but that's discussed sort of on the basic level as well.

Laurent Goetschel:

I would like to mention an idea I got while listening to Peter Burgess about the notion of EXTRA Europe and also combining it with a statement Eva Novotny made regarding the negotiations which are no negotiations actually, which contradicts somewhat what I said regarding the possibility for different shaded types of negotiation. I don't think that certain changes will occur if we think into the future. And I think that actually Europe may very well define better in the future what it will be, what it is, while defining its relations towards what we call extra-Europe. And you mentioned very nicely the fact that if we talk about Turkey, Norway, Switzerland, now independent of what you think might be or might not be regarding Norway or Switzerland, I mean, it's theoretically conceivable that these countries might also be members once. When we talk about Morocco, or about China, we know they will never be members of the European Union. But still, there will be another type of relationship between Europe and these countries in both directions. And instead of talking, I mean that's not a critique, but it's projecting into the future about European frontiers,

maybe this is not the right issue, regarding 2020 or 2030 or 2050. Maybe it's about these type of relationships Europe develops being some kind of federal state or non-federal state, whatever we may call it then, towards these other types of regions which have really important and intense links, economically, resource-wise, migration-wise, several dimensions, towards Europe and how Europe deals with them. And when we talk about still possible enlargements which might occur, this will possibly not be the type of negotiations you have experienced, as a diplomat, as Austria. But these will be different types of exchanges, for example, just parts of the acquis, which will not be as holy anymore as they are today, will be taken over, or not taken over by the other states, even if this may seem difficult to imagine today.

Brigitte Fuchs:

At this point I would like to invite people from the audience. There are two hands up, three hands up. Shall we start with the second row, the lady in the second row, if you wait for the microphone, please.

Speaker #1 from audience:

I really enjoyed the panel. I have two questions. It doesn't relate to security at all. One, it's mostly to the emasure, but any of you can take it: when you look at the situation right now, Rumania, Hungary, Latvia, is in deep economic trouble and what this illustrates is that in the last round of enlargement apparently the EU acquis and all the negotiations over the adoption of the acquis and the implementation of the acquis has not been monitored well because this day their situation goes beyond the typical impact of the economic crisis. And the central eastern European countries' debt, or loans lets say, from Austrian banks currently is about 70 percent of the Austrian GDP. So if Hungary sinks Austria also sinks with it. Well, at least it will have dire difficulties. Now, when you're looking at it from the Turkish point of view, the fact that, you know, Turkish banking reforms have been done in 2001, economically Turkey is much sounder than lets say most of the central European countries and we are not inside the European Union, takes me to Peter's comments that you can get all these, you know, that, very much like Norway, it's good to be outside of the European Union at this current stage because of the regulations that the EU is imposing, while at the same time developing or growing rapidly. This doesn't mean that Turkey doesn't have problems but it just illustrates that the previous enlargement process has made serious mistakes and the EU finds itself in a situation of rescuing the central eastern European states. That's question one.

The second question is, 2020 is probably too early ahead. But let's say if you think about 2035, 2050, and if you look at the impact of demographic trends, and it hasn't yet come out in the symposium at all, the generation E here are only one Austrian. I just asked, they are Turks Swiss and Norwegians and there's only one Austrian. Population growth rates are declining in all of Europe. And there are certain populations that are still growing in certain parts of Europe are the Turkish immigration populations who are let's say the third generation Europeans or third generation Turks. So by the time you look at let's say 2050, this generation's grandchildren will no longer, will have to work much longer hours and much more to compensate for the previous generation's pension plans. So that's one aspect of it. Plus, labour productivity is going to decline rapidly. So when you look at 2050 and you look at Europe, I see an aging continent which is laden with significant regulations, that is still stuck in, well, in Peter's terms, in its own past in certain areas. You didn't say that but I'm adding it; very Euro-centric, racist, ethnic division still taken as important. So by the time you come to 2050, I think the core old Europe will now look into what it calls extra-Europe today as the new frontier.

Brigitte Fuchs:

I would suggest that we take a few statements and questions together.

Peter Burgess:

Well, as has been reflected in the talks until now, I mean, enlargement, that's a problem for the EU. That's why we have the Lisbon Treaty. But I would say that not enlarging, that is an existential problem for the EU, because if the EU decided not to enlarge anymore, it would lose its greatest source of power in foreign policy. I mean, this is the carrot. Every EU strategy is based on the potential of becoming a member at some time. And the other problem is of course that if the EU does not continue to enlarge you will lose that kind of narrative that you always describe the EU by, saying that we are an inclusive peacemaking kind of entity. But if we stop doing that, the EU will be nothing but trade bloc for everyone else outside it. So in that sense, the EU has to continue to enlarge. The Lisbon Treaty will buy time only, so that means we have to continue enlarging and what's a bit surprising to me is that the panellists so far have not mentioned intra-Europe as the option. A multi-tier Europe with a two, three, four, five speed Europe, because that would be the way to actually continue to enlarge.

Ok. But I think that's...you answered my question. Still a good comment I would say.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Thank you. Mr Gärtner?

Heinz Gärtner:

Thank you. Since Sir Peter Burgess doesn't dare to be provocative, I will do so. And I will pick up the bare input initiative and output legitimacy. So, if I look back, the main initiatives which were visible outside of Europe came from the big European states. So the whole security and defence policy, Saint Malo process and battle group concept, then we have the EU3, concerning Iran, we have the members of the contact group, Balkans, after all they are the big states in the UN security council. So what I see, or might see emerging is this sort of directoire concept of big European states and that might lead to a small state, big state divide in Europe. So would that be a possibility? And that would be interesting to link that to Eva's non-polar world, so how it plays this out concerning the small states in Europe. Thank you.

Brigitte Fuchs:

And one more in the front.

Speaker #2 from audience:

Thank you very much. I would like to address myself to Madame Novotny, but before I do that I would like to congratulate whoever find out the name of this conference because they could have called it, instead of EXTRA Europe, they could have called it outsiders and insiders. They did not do that. So this is a very positive thing. My question to Madame Novotny is the fact that she has been touching on something very important which is the border question. Now when I started in 1963 my studies on migration a Greek sociologist had just published a small book in which he was touching about which countries are prone to migrate more to Europe and which ones less and he tried to define different borders. And one of the borders he had designed, which has not taken place, is that he redesigned the Mediterranean and included all the southern shores of the Mediterranean in Europe. Now, that is one option, another option would be of course to make a definition over the Atlantic and include America and Canada, or Mexico, in this definition. So I would like to know what Madame Novotny thinks about whether there is any usefulness in defining borders, or let's take other criteria. But one little sentence I want to say: I'm leaving Linz

very optimistic. Now, in 2020 I will be 99 years old and the likeliness that I can be here is very, I don't know whether it's high or not, so I want to point out something a lady showed to me: the water installation in this building. They put faucets and one faucet is called heaven and one faucet is called hell. I mean, cold and warm is defined. Now I opened both of them and both of them are running cool, so that is a symptom that probably we are going to move slowly in some kind of direction, which is not going to be very hot and not going to be very cold. Thank you so much.

Peter Burgess:

Or that hell is frozen over.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Thank you. Before we start handing out answers, I have to look at the clock and it says 15:28. Theoretically we should be finished in two minutes which we are obviously not going to be and I look towards the organisers and I get a smile which means we can carry on. Who wants to, on the panel, wants to start answering? I think most questions came to you Eva.

Eva Nowotny:

I think everyone will have to answer. The questions were addressed to everybody and of a very diverse nature. I would just pick out a few of the issues that have been raised.

To start with the last question about the borders and the Mediterranean, first of all, a couple of years ago, a young French historian drew a map of Europe in which he put all the changes of borders on the whole European continent from the end of the middle ages till today. And when you looked at that map you had only the heartland of France, the heartland of the Iberian peninsula and the heartland of Britain that were untouched by any border changes, even on the fringes of those countries you had them. And the rest of Europe was like a million fold fragmented mirror, a broken mirror, with lines like a spider web going all over the place. It was very impressive and it's the best argument that I've seen to answer sort of the question of the futility of borders and this discussion. On the other side, the discussion is there and politically we will have to come up with some answers. I don't think that you can redraw the map of the Mediterranean, but there was another French historian, Fernand Braudel, who wrote a beautiful book about the Mediterranean and where he said that the Mediterranean never was a border but it was

always a data highway where information flowed from one side, one rim of the Mediterranean to the other, which is a very beautiful concept. And I think this is really, also to come back to another issue that was raised in the discussion, the European Union is an open system. We will never, I think, come to a point, you know, fortress Europe, we are closing ourselves off. I mean, first of all, because economically that's not feasible, I mean, we are all export-oriented countries that depend on interaction with the globe. The diverse membership of the European Union where countries have long historic relationships to other parts of the world, Britain with the commonwealth, France with the former colonies, Spain, Portugal, Austria, with its outreach into the European east, into central Europe and so on. So these relations are there and they are very powerful and they have their own dynamic and we will never come to a point where we say, ok, enough of all that, we build a wall around ourselves and live happily ever after. This is not going to happen. And this whole concept of establishing tailor-made close relationships to the countries around the European Union, whether it is like with Norway through the European economic area, or with the neighbourhood policy programmes, and so on. These outreach programmes are there and they I think are an indicator how the European Union itself defines and sees itself.

I would also like to take up briefly the issue of sort of the multi-tier or what do you call it, *geometrie variable*, or differentiated integration. And to a certain measure we have that already because there are, I mean not all European Union countries are members of the monetary Union, not all of them are in Schengen. I mean you have these different levels of integration already, but, and I think this is an essential issue here; you have to have a common base of rule that is applicable for everybody. Then you can have a system where some countries move quicker or go deeper on some of the issues. But a basic rule of law must be applicable for everybody who is in the system, because otherwise it becomes unmanageable and it's not like a menu of a Chinese restaurant where you say, ok, I take number 14 and then 38A and so on. This is not going to work.

Laurent Goetschel:

Yes, I'd like to firstly briefly pick up on Heinz Gaernter's question regarding the *directoire* and the issue of, well, policy output in this regard. I think you're right and wrong at the same time. You're right in the sense that in regard to the foreign and security policy this has been the case, probably always; it also was the case when it didn't work at the beginning in this field. And regarding foreign and security policy, this is a sphere where

traditional notions of statehood, of sovereignty, of power linked to size and all types of resources, will prevail, as long as it will be important to be American or Chinese or Russian as compared to being from Liechtenstein or Zimbabwe. This will still be for a long time a big difference. On the other side, if you go to other policy spheres, like environmental policy, social policy, whatever, I think this has not traditionally been the case. It may have been the case with preventing things, like with the social charter and the British and so on. And even there they couldn't really prevent it; maybe they didn't even really want to prevent it. And, I think within the European Union we have had the tradition of shifting types of alliances and conglomerates of states depending on the issues. It was never more than one or two issues north versus south or small versus big or east versus west. And I think this will continue to be the case. So I don't see this type of problems arising. I also see stronger democratic elements coming up where the population element will become more important, and this of course indirectly. Also raising the notion of size because we know there are more Germans than people from Belgian, than Austrian of course, and also the Swiss wouldn't be so many if we would join. But this is of course and element of size which is different than if you look at it from the perspective of states. And, very quickly – is it still allowed to comment on the panellists?

Brigitte Fuchs:

Go ahead.

Peter Burgess:

Ok, to pick up one of the elements Eva Novotny just mentioned. Of course I also agree there will also be, we will always need a common basis on which to build. But I think what actually belongs to this basis, this will be negotiable after a certain degree, within the member states of course and towards the other ones, and as the Union expands, I mean, the way you mentioned it is the way has been true until now is basically if you're part of the club you can decide if you want to follow up more quickly or not at all, you know, with some time lag and for the new ones this didn't count because they weren't already members of it. And I think we think a little bit more into the future, this also might become, might, negotiable and I think it would probably be the condition for successful further enlargement, however we may want to call it, in the future.

Atilla Eralp:

On differentiated integration, I think differentiated integration is definitely a viable option for the future of European integration. But the critical question is: what kind of differentiated integration? Is differentiated integration going to be used as an instrument to create a core and marginalise others and exclude others or will it be inclusive, is a critical questions. And definitely, there is differentiated integration in the European Union but among the members, you know. The critical, again, another question, is how to bring aspiring countries or non-members into differentiated integration. And here we need more creative thinking on institutional matter. And in a way the European Union should here try to work on certain incentives to bring aspiring and non-members into such links. And even think of some way, institutional links, because of most of the countries, lets say, in the neighbourhood or aspiring countries who would like to be members of the European Union, they are not involved in the institutional mechanisms. And there's a certain position of conditionality through different kinds of mechanisms, and as a result you have less ownership by those countries. So, thinking of Ershman and important economies, you need to give voice to others in order to have ownership. So I think in terms of differentiated integration these are some of the critical issues. On the issue of non-polar system, I'm trying to understand your notion of non-polar system, but your presentation showed that the EU is an important pole, you know. So again, there are other poles but EU is an important pole in the international system, so we have other poles. And one of the critical issues here is the relationship between Europe and the United States, which has become problematic recently. Whether it will be revitalised and there will be closer relations between Europe and the United States on extremely important international matters and middle eastern issues, that's what we should watch for. On the issue of enlargement, I have made an argument for enlargement because I think enlargement is a crucial policy in terms of making the EU a major transformative actor, through the enlargement policy the EU was able to influence important actors in European periphery and they were able to change as a result, which is a great asset really. And in that sense it shouldn't be neglected. For example, I didn't talk about the Turkish case, but even in the Turkish case, the EU was able to transform Turkey for a while. But as the whole membership issue became ambivalent, the EU started to lose that capacity, which is quite unfortunate really because EU was to a certain degree was transforming a country the size of Turkey without much financial resources. When you think about the advantage and everything fro the European perspective, it is such a major advantage. And to lose that kind of a capacity is an important setback.

Peter Burgess:

So many interesting ideas here, thanks very much. I want to first to address your comments about fortress Europa; you didn't say it that way. But to remind us that it's minted from an assessment of the feudal period. So I'm not really sure of your assessment of the present. I suppose my point is that it's precisely not a geo-political question, so this image of the mirror fragments of the map of Europe is very evocative. I think what's important about the borders today is that they're conceptually moving too and they get imposed for example through the European neighbourhood programme so that people in Moldova feel the European border in the middle of their lives, or in the Mediterranean, or the, what should we say, the extra-territorial operations carried out by Frontex in the Atlantic ocean. This is a European border in my analysis. So I think there is a change, it is a fortress Europe idea that's, but it's a different kind of idea of the fortress, not just the one that lies on the political geographic borders. Then the guy in the Norwegian darkness back there, and it uses, it's professor Goetschel's idea too, of the internal differentiation I think is an excellent analysis and I really find that interesting and plausible. What I don't find plausible is just the straightforward holding account of the European idea of inclusion through acceptance of principles, which is, as you're making fun of it yourself I think, tongue in cheek, that it's plausible and it's supplied with, in a sort of contradictory way all the time. That it's impossible to have this eternal inclusion even though this is the liberal way, straight out of Voltaire of course. And that means that the whole Earth will be European Union and then we'll start looking at the moon. And then on the old Europe new Europe, I share very much your analysis, but probably not your conclusion that even though actually, and I hate to make this the last word of the symposium so let's hope it's not, even though I think Europe would be enriched by Turkey, being included, Europe has such a big need of it being the *other* that it won't happen for that reason. Turkey is absolutely integral to Europe, as right outside it.

Atilla Eralp:

The margins.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Thank you. Now, this is the last chance for generation E to have its word. I did think there was somebody who wanted to say something in the front.

Speaker #3 from audience:

Thank you. We would like to thank you first for interesting points and views because we've been working on this topic for the last days and we've been discussing many of the points you have been raising here. There's even something I would like to ask you more about and that's the differentiated integration, the two-speed path levels. Isn't this actually happening at the moment that you mention, through the Euro zone and the monetary Union? And how much do you think the EU can stand before it collapses if we keep on in different speeds, how long will it take before you will actually not be able to unite what the aims would be?

And would I be allowed to pass the microphone to her?

Brigitte Fuchs:

Yes, sure.

Speaker #4 from audience:

I was just wondering about your points of view on the way that the EU is narrowing down to become a country, almost. It does, I mean, I am from Norway so I'm kind of on the outside but with the flag, they got their own flag, they got their own currency, their borders are open because of freedoms, you can move as you want without passport. I mean, there's a lot of same things and they want their own army, they want their own leader. So what's your point of view on that?

Brigitte Fuchs:

Are you asking me personally?

Speaker #4 from audience:

Anyone who wants to answer.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Well, if you ask me there's always one difference except for Switzerland, in most countries you have one language while in Europe you do not have one language and you do not have one singular tradition and one singular cultural tradition so I think that would take a very, very long time until Europe would become one single country in the sense of the

United States. And even the United States of America are in many extents not one single country. The United States are very different if you look down to, I don't know to, New Mexico or you go up to Alaska or to the east coast, people have very, very different traditions but even so they are, they consider themselves being Americans. They probably will consider themselves being Texans first. And even if, which nobody thinks about nowadays, there would be something like the United States of Europe one day, that doesn't mean that it would have to be a very uniformed country where everyone is doing the same thing and speaks the same language and so on.

Laurent Goetschel:

Just to the first question, to give you an example: should, whenever, Switzerland start negotiation talks, exchange, communication, about accession, for example, the issue might pop up if Switzerland should take, should also adopt the Euro or not. It would be for sure very important issue inside Switzerland. So on the other side, for the EU, Switzerland joining would mean 3 billion plus a year, so they might be ready to say ok, stick with the Swiss francs if you think it's so much nicer than the Euro, and there is some relation between the Swiss franc and the Euro anyway. This is something that until now would not have been possible and that is still a novum. I mean, if the new countries, if I may say it like this, the nice thing with accessions which happened during the last years, as certain countries didn't fulfil the criteria, of course it wasn't an issue. But it's not very clear if once you fulfil the criteria and you are a new member if you then will be forced to adopt the Euro or not, just as an example.

And regarding the second remark, just very briefly, I think the fascinating thing is precisely that it is not a state. We wouldn't have a conference about extra-France or extra-Germany. Who would like to be extra-France or extra-Germany? So I think we have to stick with this European specialty. And I think a lot of the fascination about whatever it is precisely that we're looking at, stems precisely from the fact that it is a political entity with a lot of dynamism which is not a state.

Eva Nowotny:

Just one last remark to the discussion: one of the slogans of the European Union is United in Diversity.

Peter Burgess:

To the Norwegian question as well: it's of course a very good one, and the answer is, there are advantages and disadvantages, but above all there's no danger of it being a state. And if Norway should ever become a member, there would be certain very large advantages and certain disadvantages. But somebody like you, I can tell you enjoy all the advantages. You have access to all the privileges of being a European citizen without any of the disadvantages.

Brigitte Fuchs:

Ok. Then we come to an end, we're drawing to a close of this seminar, this symposium. I thank all my members on the panel very much for being here and for sharing your very interesting thoughts with us. I do thank the audience tremendously for holding on so long, especially the young people in front here who have really been here for the last 3 days, I've seen them in every session and I think that's very admirable. And I thank the organisers for this seminar because I think it was for a lot of us very, very interesting, new thoughts, something we can take home and gives us more new ideas in life. Thank you.